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Abstract 
This report provides a detailed specification of a humanitarian relief scenario involving significant 
civil-military  cooperation.  The  scenario  aims  to  highlight  some  challenges  and  opportunities  for 
semantic integration and knowledge processing in support of humanitarian relief efforts undertaken 
against a backdrop of military conflict. The scenario depicts an earthquake and associated flood 
event occurring in Afghanistan at the time of the US-led coalition effort to displace the former 
Taliban  regime.  The  flood  event  occurs  as  a  secondary  phenomenon  to  the  earthquake  and 
precipitates a full-scale humanitarian relief effort co-opting the resources of both humanitarian and 
military agencies. This scenario will serve to showcase the capabilities of the AKTiveSA TDS with 
respect to enhanced situation awareness and improved information fusion. Such capabilities depend 
on the ability to exploit multiple sources of information and sophisticated query capabilities in order 
to  expedite  the  dissemination  of  relevant  information  to  executive  agencies  in  a  timely  and 
appropriate  fashion.  The  scenario  narrative  draws  attention  to  some  of  the  information 
requirements demanded by military and humanitarian decision makers in the context of complex 
emergency situations. It also serves to illustrate the critical knowledge processing capabilities of 
agents with respect to the assessment of disaster situations and relief effort planning. Finally, the 
scenario provides an indication of the requirements for visualization and interaction that should be 
afforded to end-user agents in order to optimise their exploitation of system capabilities. This report 
also  provides  background  information  about  the  Standard  Operating  Procedures  (SOPs)  of 
humanitarian agencies with respect to disaster relief and reviews guidelines on the nature of civil-
military coordination in the context of disaster relief efforts in conflict situations. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Project Background 
This project (contract no: 8.14, codename: AKTiveSA) addresses the development of a Technical 
Demonstrator  System  (TDS)  to  showcase  the  role  played  by  Semantic  Web  technologies  in 
knowledge-intensive  information  fusion  and  enhanced  situation  awareness.  The  work  is  being 
undertaken  by  the  University  of  Southampton  as  part  of  the  MoDs  (Ministry  of  Defence)  DTC 
(Defence  Technology  Centre)  initiative
1. The  DTCs represent a formal collaborative agreement 
between  industry  and  academic  experts  to  enhance  the defensive  capabilities  of  UK  (United 
Kingdom) military forces. 
This project is an extension to an earlier initiative, called FloodSim
2, which demonstrated how 
semantically-enriched information, interpreted against the backdrop of formal ontologies, could be 
used to  improve situation awareness with respect to humanitarian relief operations. The current 
project has a similar objective in that it aims to improve operational effectiveness in the planning, 
coordination and delivery of humanitarian relief efforts by enhanc ing the situation awareness of 
executive decision makers. 
1.2  Document Purpose 
This document provides a detailed specification of a humanitarian relief scenario involving significant 
civil-military  cooperation.  An  initial  scenario  specification  was  delivered  at  the  outset  of  the 
AKTiveSA project (DTC/WP100/Scenario), which aimed to provide a basis for scoping activities in the 
context of the ontology engineering initiative (WP200). Since the status of the AKTiveSA project is 
now moving into its development phase (WP300) it is important to flesh out aspects of the initial 
scenario  specification  in  order  to  delineate  the  actual  objects  and  events  that  feature  in  the 
scenario, the knowledge and reasoning capabilities of the system with respect to the scenario and 
the  kinds  of  user  interaction  supported  by  the  AKTiveSA  framework.  This  document  provides  a 
specification of one scenario that forms part of the larger scenario specification. 
1.3  Document Structure 
The structure of the current document reflects the aims outlined in Section 1.2. Section 2 provides 
background information about the scenario in the form of preceding events and actions. To a large 
extent this information is derived from actual events that occurred in the context of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, i.e. the strategic operations in Afghanistan by the US-led coalition in 2001/2002. 
Section  3  provides  an  overview  of  the  scenario  described  throughout  the  remainder  of  this 
document. It provides information about the kinds of objects that feature in the scenario and the 
main events that occur throughout the scenario timeline. Section 4 provides further information 
about the scenario in the form of a timeline of events. This is the most important section from the 
perspective of the scenario specification initiative since it describes the timeline of the scenario, 
decomposed into a number of distinct phases. It also provides views of the tactical picture with 
                                                            
1 http://www.mod.uk/dtc/index.html 
2 http://www.aktors.org/technologies/floodsim/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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respect to scenario snapshots created using the Google Earth client
3. Section 5 provides an overview 
of the background information upon which the scenario specification is based. This information was 
assimilated as part of the research effort devoted to describing the scenario. 
As a description of a knowledge-rich application domain, namely the domain of militar y operations 
and humanitarian relief efforts, this document uses a number of acronyms and abbreviations. These 
are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix B and Appendix C present some standard materials used by 
humanitarian aid agencies in the context of relief  efforts. These materials are reproduced here in 
order to provide an indication of the information requirements associated with needs assessment 
and relief planning.   
                                                            
3 http://earth.google.com/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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2  Scenario Background 
The  scenario  is  set  in  Afghanistan  in  the  year  2002.  US  and  UK  forces  have  been  deployed  in 
Afghanistan to conduct strategic operations against the Taliban regime. Following a successful air 
campaign and land-based assault, the Taliban have been overthrown and major conflict operations 
have  been  concluded.  Despite  this,  pockets  of  resistance  remain  in  the  southern  and  western 
regions of Afghanistan and the risk of both terrorist attacks against the local civilian population and 
assaults on coalition forces remains high. Thus far the occurrence of such incidents has been largely 
restricted to the Kandahar, Oruzgan, Zabul, Helmand and Farah provinces. US and UK ground forces 
have been deployed in-theatre both in the north and south of Afghanistan and these units continue 
to undertake strategic operations against Taliban insurgents largely within the provinces of Kandahar 
and Oruzgan. These operations are backed up by CAS (Close Air Support) and air strikes against 
strategic targets in Kandahar. Ground forces have also been tasked with peace support, counter-
terrorism and humanitarian relief activities in the occupied areas, mostly in the eastern provinces. In 
addition, the UN has deployed an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF
4) to assist with peace 
support operations. 
A number of humanitarian aid groups are currently operating in then occupied areas. These include: 
  UNAMA
5 (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) 
  CARE International
6 
  ACTED
7 (Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development) 
  DACAAR
8 (Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) 
  UNOPS
9 (United Nations Offices for Projects Services) 
  UNHCR
10 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 
  WFP
11 (World Food Programme) 





14 (International Committee of the Red Cross)  
  WHO
15 (World Health Organization)  
  FAO
16 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 












15 http://www.who.int/en/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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  MSF
17 (Médecins Sans Frontières) 
These organizations provide humanitarian assistance in the form of food and medical supplies, fresh 
water, and shelter (in the form of refugee camps). The ongoing mi litary conflict has created a 
refugee crisis in which many local residents have moved east to leave Afghanistan via the Pakistan 
border. Following the closure of this border a number of  IDP (Internally Displaced Person) camps 
have been established in the east of the country and these continue to receive new inhabitants from 
both conflict zones and areas affected by military conflict. Humanitarian aid organizations are 
assisted in their duties by military units who provide both logistical support  and security for aid 
distribution. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
16 http://www.fao.org/ 
17 http://www.msf.org/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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3  Scenario Overview 
 
Figure 3.1: Flood Zone North of Ghazni 
At  12:10  hours  on  29
th  March  2002,  seismometer  readings  indicate  the  occurrence  of  a  large 
earthquake in the region of the Baghlan/Bamyan border region. Information about the earthquake is 
provided  by  NEIC
18  (National Earthquake Information Center), who indicate the magnitude an d 
location (epicentre and hypocentre) of the Earthquake. This initial information is subsequently 
corroborated by other seismic monitoring centres. The location and magnitude of the earthquake 
indicate a medium intensity earthquake with associated structur al damage and possible civilian 
casualties. Information from  GDACS
19 (Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System) provides a 
characterization of the earthquake and also indicates its likely humanitarian impact. Unfortunately, 
in addition to the devastation caused by the earthquake in the immediate vicinity (mostly mediated 
by the collapse of buildings local settlements) the magnitude of the earthquake is sufficient to cause 
the Band Sultan dam, located north of Ghazni, to collapse and cause massive inunda tion of the 
surrounding region due to the accumulation of water from melted snow in the dam reservoir. The 
resulting flood is responsible for the destruction of hundreds of houses, the death of at least 1000 
people and the displacement of many more. In res ponse to the Earthquake, US -led coalition and 
ISAF forces in concert with humanitarian aid organizations aim to provide humanitarian assistance to 
the afflicted region. The immediate humanitarian response assumes the form of food, shelter and 
medical aid provision. Military units are also tasked with search and rescue operations in the flooded 
region, the transport of aid supplies and the provision of security for aid efforts. The relief effort is 
complicated by both the security situation and the damage caused to the local road network by the 
flood water. A number of land routes in the region of the disaster zone have been blocked by rising 
flood water, which affects the overland transport of aid supplies. In addition, the security situation 
makes both land -based and airborne vehicles vulnerable to enemy fire thereby making some 
transport routes hazardous and others impassable. As the crisis develops over the next few days 
                                                            
18 http://neic.usgs.gov/ 
19 http://www.gdacs.org/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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there  are  reports  of  a  number  of  outbreaks  of  water  borne  diseases  and  the  possibility  of  an 
epidemic becomes a realistic possibility.  
There are also longer term concerns. The inundation has washed away thousands of hectares of 
cultivation land (including young wheat crops that are a bulk of the livelihood of some farmers), 
destroyed  hundreds  of  shops  and  compromised  a  valuable  source  of  water  irrigation  to  many 
thousands of families and farms. This causes longer term concerns for the economic viability of the 
region and the impact of the inundation on future food security. 
 
Figure 3.2: Flood Devastation in Ghazni 
 UNCLASSIFIED 
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4  Scenario Timeline 
4.1  Overview 
This section  details the timeline of the scenario. The timeline is  decomposed into a  number of 
distinct phases
20: 
  Pre-Crisis  Phase:  the  period  immediately  before  the  crisis.  This  period  is  dominated  by 
military activities in the form of air strikes against Taliban strongholds in Kandahar. IDP 
movements are apparent in the east of the country.  
  Crisis  Phase:  the  period  encompassing  the  actual  occurrence  of  the  earthquake  and 
associated flood. This period is dominated by the acquisition of information and preparation 
for the relief effort. Key knowledge-intensive tasks undertaken by humanitarian actors at 
this phase of the scenario include needs assessment and relief planning. 
  Emergency Response Phase: the period associated with initial relief efforts. This includes 
the distribution of food and water aid, the establishment of a relief camp on the outskirts of 
Ghazni and the search and rescue of individuals affected by the flood. 
  Post-Crisis  Phase
21:  the  period  in  which  the  immediate  threat  to  human  life  has  been 
contained. In the context of the current scenario this phase marks the period in which the 
flood  waters  are  contained  and  flood  levels  are  stable.  Humanitarian  relief  has  been 
provided to most people affected by the flood and injured individuals have been evacuated 
to the relief camp or to field hospitals in Kabul. The main humanitarian threat at this stage of 
the scenario is the possibility of disease outbreaks caused by the flood, mostly due to the 
contamination of drinking water. 
  Durable Solution Phase: the period in which attention focuses on rehabilitation, rebuilding 
and resettlement activities. This phase is marked by a consideration of the possible long 
term impacts of the flood on local inhabitants and the country as a whole. Key issues in this 
phase concern the economic impact of the flood and the possibility of future food insecurity 
caused by damage to crops and agricultural land.   
Each phase is characterized in terms of the following: 
  Time Period: the time period encompassed by the phase. 
  Timeline: a table indicating the temporal location of events within the timeline. A graphic 
display of the timeline is also provided. 
                                                            
20 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (http://www.fema.gov) describes three phases associated with 
a humanitarian emergency situation: the pre-crisis phase, which is concerned with the collection and updating 
of disaster data and monitoring of disaster-related information sources for early warning purposes; the crisis 
phase,  which  is  concerned  with  the  exchange  of  information  among  the  participating  organizations,  the 
dissemination of aid requirements, and the coordination of the relief effort and supply of aid resources; finally, 
the post-crisis phase, which summarizes the lessons learned and proposes adjustments of existing tools or 
methods.  These  phases  have  been  expanded  somewhat  in  the  current  scenario  specification  in  order  to 
provide a more detailed temporal profile of the scenario timeline. 
21 In the current scenario the post -emergency phase and durable solution phase have been combined for 
purposes of brevity. Most of the knowledge processing and situation monitoring activiti es occur in the first 
three phases of the scenario, i.e. the pre-crisis, crisis, and emergency response phases. UNCLASSIFIED 
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  Figures:  references  to  illustrations  that  indicate  the  tactical  picture(s)
22  with respect to 
humanitarian relief efforts and/or military action. 
  Synopsis: a brief textual description of the main events within the phase. 
  Focus  Task  Areas:  an  indication  of  the  kinds  of  activities,  including  knowledge-intensive 
tasks,  undertaken  by  humanitarian,  military  and  knowledge  system  agents  during  the 
scenario.  These  tasks  subsume  those  that  can  be  undertaken  autonomously  by  the 
knowledge  system  component  of  the  AKTiveSA  framework  and  those  that  have  to  be 
undertaken in collaboration with external agents
23. In the current context, a knowledge -
intensive task is deemed to be any task that requires the use of a reasoning service and 
associated rule sets or which exploits the formal semantics of  the ontology language. This 
includes the use of OWL (Ontology Web Language) subsumption reasoning services. 
                                                            
22 In the context of the scenario narrative we describe the tactical picture from a limited ‘God’s eye view’, i.e. 
we assume that the tactical picture is a composite of both of the humanitarian and military tactical pictures. 
The illustrations are limited in the sense that they do not represent all entities in the theatre of operations. 
Instead, they represent those that are deemed relevant to the humanitarian crisis centred on the flood event 
or those that are deemed important from the perspective of demonstrating the multi-functional capabilities of 
the AKTiveSA TDS. It should be remembered that this is unlikely to be the case in the context of most real-
world operations, since the military may not be interested in certain information deemed important to relief 
workers and humanitarian agencies, for their part, will not have access to classified military information, e.g. 
the disposition and activities of military agents. 
23 From the perspective of the AKTiveSA TDS, these tasks should be accessible from a task hierarchy within the 
main application interface. An agent should be able to invoke the task and specify the required parameters of 
the task in  terms of the ontology elements. In some cases, the task will have to be undertaken in a 
collaborative fashion in which the user provides information and receives feedback at each stage of the 
reasoning process. User interaction in the context of these tasks could be mediated via a wizard-like interface 
component. The execution of each task at the level of the AKTiveSA framework relies on the invocation of a 
reasoning service agent.  UNCLASSIFIED 
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4.2  Pre-Crisis Phase 
 
Figure 4.1: Scenario Overview UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.2: Inbound Air Strike Force UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.3: Tactical Picture – Kandahar UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.4: Tactical Picture – Kabul UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.5: IDP Camps & IDP Movements 
4.2.1  Time Period 
  29/03/2002 00:00 - 29/03/2002 12:00 
4.2.2  Timeline 
 
Figure 4.6: Pre-Crisis Phase Timeline 
Time  Event  Description 
29/03/2002 02:40  Air Strike Against Kandahar  Air strikes against strategic targets in Kandahar by F-14 
Tomcats. 
29/03/2002 03:44  Air Strike Against Kandahar  Air strikes against strategic targets at Kandahar airport by 
F/A-18 Hornets. 
29/03/2002 09:13  Car Bombing – Kabul  Terrorist  incident  in  the  form  of  a  car  bombing  within 
Kabul.  
29/03/2002 10:24  Relief Convoy Movement  Translocation  of  relief  convoy  moving  from  Pakistan 
border region. 
29/03/2002 11:28  Relief Convoy Movement  Translocation  of  relief  convoy  moving  from  Pakistan 
border region. 
29/03/2002 00:00 29/03/2002 12:00
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00
02:40
Air Strike Against Kandahar
09:13




Air Strike Against Kandahar
11:28
Relief Convoy MovementUNCLASSIFIED 
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4.2.3  Figures 
  Figure 4.1 
  Figure 4.2 
  Figure 4.3 
  Figure 4.4 
  Figure 4.5 
4.2.4  Synopsis 
This phase marks the beginning of the scenario and features a number of either static or dynamic 
entities. Both air and ground military assets are operating in-theatre with air strikes against strategic 
targets  in  Kandahar,  including  military  headquarters,  the  airport  control  tower  and  radar 
installations. The tactical picture indicates a number of enemy positions in and around Kandahar. 
These are largely the focus of coalition strategic operations, which aim to  neutralize the threat 
posed by these enemy units. Ground forces in the form of 3 Command Brigade
24 (UK) and the 15
th 
Marine Expeditionary Force
25 (US) occupy positions to the east of Kandahar with  FOO (Forward 
Observation Officer) units in situ at strategic locations. A single Nimrod aircraft is responsible for 
performing electronic and photo reconnaissance and an E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control 
System) aircraft is deployed to the south west providing surveillance and comm and and control 
communications. The tactical picture indicates a number of strike aircraft undertaking night -time 
raids on Kandahar from carrier bases in the Arabian Sea. These units receive C4I (Command, Control, 
Communications,  Computers  and  Intelligence )  support  from  the  aforementioned  E -3  AWACS 
platform. 
UK and US military forces have established a command HQ (Head Quarters) on the outskirts of Kabul 
in the vicinity of Kabul Airport. Coalition forces have also established a  FOB (Forward Operating 
Base) in Mazar-e Sharif, approximately 180 miles north-west of Kabul. In the morning of the 29
th a 
terrorist incident in the form of a car bombing is reported in the capital city. This serves to indicate 
the inherent instability of the current situation. 
IDP camps are established in the east of the country to accommodate Afghan citizens attempting to 
flee the conflict. IDP movements are apparent throughout the entire timeline of the scenario. One 
group of IDPs is reported south-west of Ghazni and is clearly heading to Ghazni by virtue of the local 
road network.  
A number of humanitarian aid organizations are operating in the region. The ERC (Emergency Relief 
Coordinator), in collaboration with the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) and acting on behalf 
of the UN Secretary General, has appointed the UNHCR to serve as the lead agency (Humanitarian 
Coordinator)  in  coordinating  and  overseeing  all  relief  efforts.  The  UNHCR  have  established  a 
significant  presence  in  the  east  of  country  in  the  form  of  the  IDP  camps  and  they  have  also 
established  a  HIC  (Humanitarian  Information  Centre)  in  Kabul.  The  HIC  is  situated  in  a  former 
embassy  within  Kabul  and  serves  as  the  focus  point  for  information  gathering,  exchange  and 
dissemination  activities  with  respect  to  relief  activities.  In  order  to  enable  coordination  and 
communication  with  military  forces,  the  UN  has  deployed  a  number  of    MLOs  (Military  Liaison 
                                                            
24 http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/1905.html 
25 http://www.usmc.mil/15thmeu/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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Officers) who operate though the HIC to establish a communication link to CJCMOTF (Coalition Joint 
Civil-Military Operations Task Force), which serves as the strategic command HQ for civil-military 
coordination on behalf of the US-led coalition forces. 
4.2.5  Focus Task Areas 
The  main  knowledge  processing  activity  to  be  undertaken  in  this  phase  of  the  scenario  is  the 
interpretation and integration of datalink message feeds from tactical datalink sources. It is assumed 
that tactical datalink messages will be instantiated within the knowledge store according to the 
constraints of the AKTiveSA domain ontology, which provides knowledge-level representations of 
the  information  content  provided  by  datalink  messages
26. The AKTiveSA framework will use a 
TacticalDatalinkIntergrationService agent to effect the interpretation and integration of tactical 
datalink information within the core ontolo gy framework. A number of tactical datalinks are 
available,  including  Link16,  Link22  and  BOWMAN.  In  some  cases  the  information  content  of 
messages exchanged via the datalink are governed by international standards - Link 16, for example, 
is a NATO standard. As the primary information exchange medium for military organizations, tactical 
datalinks serve as an important source of information about environmental conditions and the 
disposition, status and activities of military assets. Unfortunately, inter -operation and information 
exchange between datalinks is somewhat problematic because the information exchange protocols, 
information content and message structure are customized for particular military purposes (e.g. Link 
16 for airborne assets; BOWMAN for grou nd forces). Semantically-enriched representations in the 
form  of  domain  ontologies  represent  a  potentially  useful  means  to  facilitate  the  successful 
interoperation  and  exchange  of  information  between  datalinks  because  the  meaning  of  the 
information content is made explicit (which facilitates interpretation) and rules can be defined which 
operate over the semantic annotations to effect data integration (which facilitates information 
exchange and interoperation).  
The ability to exploit semantic integration f or the purposes of information exchange serves to 
enhance situation awareness and improve force coordination/integration. The tactical picture is 
enriched because force commanders can visualize the juxtaposition of multiple military assets in a 
manner that  transcends the boundaries of service division, environment category and national 
identity. This improved situation awareness yields many advantages at the strategic, tactical and 
operational levels, including 
  the  ability  to  opportunistically  exploit  situation  contingencies  in  a  manner 
commensurate with strategic objectives; 
  the ability to avoid blue-on-blue engagements;  
  the ability to avoid duplication of effort and; 
  the ability to inform decision processes about the most effective COA (Course of Action) 
required to fulfil mission objectives. 
                                                            
26 The current service portfolio is limited to the integration of information derived from the Link 16 interface. 
Our aim is to show how the information content of Link 16 messages can be integrated with domain ontologies 
as the basis for establishing a Common Relevant Operational Picture (or CROP). Although, we do not show how 
this approach could be extended to other types of tactical datalink, the current strategy should apply equally 
well to these communication systems. UNCLASSIFIED 
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Semantic  integration  also  facilitates  the  exchange  of  information  between  military  communities 
thereby enabling the capability for self-synchronization and cross-force integration, key components 
of the UK’s Defence Capability Framework (The UK Joint High Level Operational Concept: An Analysis 
of the Components of the UK Defence Capability Framework, 2005). 
In  order  to  unleash  the  capability  for  improved  situation  awareness,  the  AKTiveSA  TDS  should 
provide a means for agents to visualize different elements of the tactical picture according to their 
particular epistemic requirements. An agent should, for example, be able to selectively view all 
airborne assets, enemy positions, the activity status of military units, the disposition of all military 
assets, etc. In general,  the key capability here will be  the  visualization  of information  sets in a 
manner  that  cross  cuts  the  traditional  boundaries  of  the  land,  air,  and  maritime  operational 
environments. In other words, an agent should be able to view the disposition of all military assets 
as a means to facilitate cross-force synchronization and enhance situation awareness across service 
division  and  environment  category.  An  example  is  the  juxtaposition  of  land  components  with 
airborne assets within the context of a unitary tactical picture. The interface should, in addition, 
enable users to access more detailed information about any of the elements that are visible in the 
tactical  picture  display
27, e.g. affiliations at the organizational and national level, mission focus, 
activity status, platform status and so on. It may also be helpful to retrieve all informa tion reports 
that are provided by a particular element, e.g. datalink information sourced from a particular 
airborne platform and field reports from FOO entities. 
In order to demonstrate the capability for opportunistic exploitation of situation contingenc ies by 
military agents, a specific task could be included in this phase of the scenario, namely, for a land -
based UK FOO unit to report a convoy of Taliban armoured vehicles en route to Kandahar concurrent 
with strategic air strikes in Kandahar. In this case a US aircraft (e.g. F-14 Tomcat) that was previously 
assigned to a deep strike mission against targets in Kandahar could be re -tasked with the objective 
of neutralizing a higher value asset, identified by UK land forces. The FOO unit could provide laser  
designation for the purposes of targeting information to the inbound strike aircraft. 
                                                            
27 Perhaps using a pop-up display dialog. UNCLASSIFIED 
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4.3  Crisis Phase 
 
Figure 4.7: Ghazni Flood Zone UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.8: Ghazni Flood Zone – Detail View UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.9: Ghazni Flood Zone – 3D Relief View 
4.3.1  Time Period 
  29/03/2002 12:00 - 30/03/2002 00:00 
4.3.2  Timeline 
 
Figure 4.10: Crisis Phase Timeline 
Time  Event  Description 
29/03/2002 12:10  Baghlan Earthquake  A  seismic  event  occurs  in  the  Baghlan/Bamyan  border 
region. Information about the seismic event is provided in 
the form of a report from NEIC. 
29/03/2002 12:48  Blackhawk Helicopter 
Dispatched to Baghlan 
(RECCE) 
A Blackhawk helicopter is dispatched to the earthquake 
region  to  provide  reconnaissance  information  regarding 
the  impact  of  the  earthquake  on  surrounding 
communities. 
29/03/2002 12:00 30/03/2002 00:00




















Assembly of Relief Effort
15:24
Dispatch of Blackhawk
Helicopter to Flood 
Zone (RECCE)
This phase of the relief effort 
involves the assimilation of 
available information for 
planning purposes.
This phase of the relief effort 
entails the sourcing of aid 
supplies and the coordination 
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Time  Event  Description 
29/03/2002 13:12  Earthquake SITREP From 
RECCE 
Information  about  the  impact  of  the  earthquake  is 
provided  by  the  aforementioned  RECCE 
(reconnaissance)  unit.  The  report  contains  information 
about structural damage associated with the earthquake 
in  local  communities.  It  also  provides  information  about 
the likely number of civilian causalities associated with the 
event. 
29/03/2002 15:10  Nimrod Reports Flooding  A  Nimrod  MR2,  engaged  in  unrelated  photo 
reconnaissance  activities,  reports  flooding  in  the  north-
west districts of Ghazni.  
29/03/2002 15.24  Dispatch of Blackhawk 
Helicopter to Flood Zone 
(RECCE) 
A Blackhawk helicopter is dispatched to reconnoitre the 
flood zone and provide information about the extent of the 
flood, the kind of damage caused and the likely number of 
civilian causalities. 
29/03/2002 15:55  Flood Zone SITREP from 
RECCE 
Report from Blackhawk RECCE unit arrives at military HQ 
in Kabul. 
29/03/2002 16:48  News Reports of Crisis  News  reports  from  news  agencies  and  broadcasters 
begin to arrive regarding earthquake and flood events. 
29/03/2002 17:28  Emergency Operations Centre 
Established 
An emergency operation centre is established to oversee 
the  planning  of  the  relief  effort  and  to  coordinate  the 
distribution of humanitarian aid. 
29/03/2002 17:28 - 
29/03/2002 20:00 
Relief Effort Planning  Multiple working groups composed of coalition forces and 
aid organizations engage in planning activities directed to 
the proposed relief effort. The focus of the planning at this 
stage concerns the kind and amount of aid distributions 
that are required, the organizations that will participate in 
the relief effort, the security situation and extent of military 
involvement, and so forth.  
29/03/2002 18:00  Dispatch of 12 Mechanized 
Brigade 
12  Mechanized  Brigade  dispatched  to  Ghazni  to 
determine  security  situation  en  route  to  Ghazni  and 
possible obstructions to aid distribution effort. 
29/03/2002 20:00 – 
30/03/2002 06:00 
Assembly of Relief Effort  The relief effort is assembled based on the outcome of 
the  aforementioned  planning  activities.  Aid  supplies  are 
requested from relief camps in the east of the country and 
additional supplies are provided by airlift to Kabul airport 
from the international community. The key problems faced 
by the relief effort at this stage of the scenario relate to 
the  sourcing  and  aggregation  of  aid  supplies.  Overland 
transport of goods from the relief camps depends on the 
existence of viable and secure land transport routes. In 
addition,  airlift  operations  require  coordination  with  the 
military in order to avoid blue-on-blue engagements with 
airborne  assets.  In  essence  the  reasoning  activities 
associated with this stage of the scenario are geared to 
providing answers to the following questions: 
  What are the aid requirements for the current 
relief effort? 
  Where are these supplies sourced from? 
  How long will it take to dispatch the supplies to 
the  affected  area  and  begin  the  distribution 
effort? 
  Given  the  possible  locations  from  which  aid 
supplies  can  be  sourced  what  problems  are 
faced  in  terms  of  transporting  these  goods  to 
the  aid  distribution  centre?  Problems  include 
the viability of transport routes and the ongoing 
security situation. What, for example, is the risk 
that relief convoys could be the target of blue-
on-blue  engagements  by  friendly  forces 
operating  in  the  area  of  transport  routes  and 
way stations? 
  What are the requirements for aid distribution? 
For  example,  does  the  supply  effort  require 
military  support  for  protection  against  hostile 
militia groups? Who needs to be contacted with 
respect  to  the  supply  effort,  e.g.  military 
authorities  may  need  to  be  contacted  with 
respect to inbound air traffic. 
  Will the relief effort detract from ongoing relief UNCLASSIFIED 
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Time  Event  Description 
efforts? If so what are the priorities concerning 
the allocation of aid to different components of 
the relief mission? 
  What additional resources are required in terms 
of  the  distribution  of  the  designated  aid 
resources?  What  types  of  personnel  are 
required  to  assist  with  the  relief  effort?  Are 
these resources readily available? 
4.3.3  Figures  
  Figure 4.7 
  Figure 4.8 
  Figure 4.9 
4.3.4  Synopsis 
At 12.10 reports emerge from NEIC of a large seismic event in the region of the Baghlan/Bamian 
border. Information about the earthquake is derived from information presented in an NEIC report 
and indicates the existence of a large magnitude earthquake. GDACS infers that structural damage is 
a possibility in the vicinity of the earthquake and that such structural damage may have contributed 
to  civilian  causalities.  This  information  provides  the  impetus  for  further  information  gathering 
activities. Inherent insecurity with respect to the air environment prohibits the use of UN helicopters 
to  investigate  the  earthquake,  but  following  consultation  with  CA  (Civil  Affairs)  units,  a 
reconnaissance  aircraft  (US  Blackhawk  helicopter)  is  dispatched  from  military  HQ  in  Kabul  to 
investigate possible damage associated with the earthquake and to report on the status of local 
communities in the area. The result of this surveillance activity is a report that approximately 80% of 
buildings within a 20 mile radius of the earthquake epicentre have been damaged or destroyed. In 
response to this information humanitarian aid organizations begin planning relief operations
28. 
At 15:10 a Nimrod aircraft reports signs of flooding as part of its photo reconnaissance activities. The 
flood is reported to affect villages in the district of Khoja Omari (also known as Khaaja Umari), as 
well as the city of Ghazni. This information is disseminated to the humanitarian community via the 
civil-military interface of the coalition forces and the HC (Humanitarian Coordinator) requests more 
detailed aerial reconnaissance information from the force commander. A military helicopter (UH -60 
Blackhawk), carrying humanitarian representatives is dispatched to further investigate this report 
and confirms that the earthquake has caused structural damage to the Band Sultan dam resulting in 
the release of large volumes of water and inundation of the local area subsuming a number of 
settlements in the region as well as agricultural land. It is unclear  what the scale of the flood is and 
how many people have been affected, but based on information about the population size of the 
affected region it is possible to derive estimates of the number of people displaced or made 
homeless by the flood. Reconnaissa nce reports from the aforementioned military helicopter, in 
association with photographic evidence derived from the Nimrod aerial photoreconnaissance unit 
                                                            
28 In the context of this scenario no further information is presented about this phenomenon or the planning 
processes  associated  with  the  relief  effort.  Rather,  the  focus  for  the  current  scenario  is  the  flood  event 
resulting  form  the  earthquake  in  the  form  of  the  structural  disintegration  of  the  Band  Sultan  dam.  The 
earthquake phenomenon itself could provide the basis for a second scenario in which the focus of attention is 
limited to the immediate effects of the earthquake, e.g. structural damage and disruption to the transport 
infrastructure. UNCLASSIFIED 
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indicates that water continues to escape from the dam and, as such, the extent of the flooded region 
may  increase  over  time.  In  addition  to  these  reconnaissance  activities  high  resolution  satellite 
imagery is obtained of the flooded region, especially of the area in and around Ghazni. The aim of 
these  images  is  to  resolve  the  extent  of  the  flooding  within  Ghazni  and  to  determine  whether 
transport routes in and out of Ghazni have been compromised by flood water. 
In  anticipation  of  an  impending  operational  requirement  to  inter-operate  with  humanitarian 
agencies with respect to the flood disaster, the CJCMOTF creates a specific CMOC (Civil-Military 
Operations Centre) to deal with the information demands and security requests of the humanitarian 
community.  Humanitarian  aid  agencies  begin  preparations  for  relief  efforts  directed  at  regions 
affected by the flood. Background information is assimilated about the affected regions in Ghazni 
province  which  includes  both  the  Ghazni  and  Khawja  Omari  districts.  This  information  includes 
population  density  information,  land  use  maps,  road  transport  network  information  and  maps 
indicating the location of settlements within the region. Information from military sources is also 
assimilated into the humanitarian tactical picture to facilitate threat assessment and emergency 
response planning. Such information is provided by military authorities in response to a request by 
the lead agency and is disseminated by the civil-military lines of communications via the CMOC.  
The HC establishes an emergency operations centre within the HIC, which serves as the focal point 
for  the  planning  and  assessment  activities  associated  with  the  relief  effort.  Seven  sectorial 
committees are created within the operations centre to address different aspects of the emergency 
situation. Such committees are responsible for coordinating relief work in a designated sector and 
reporting back to the lead agency. Representatives of the coalition forces from the aforementioned 
CMOC  are  in  attendance  at  some  of  these  sectorial  committee  meetings  in  order  to  provide 
information  on  the  security  situation  and  to  provide  a  link  with  military  authorities  regarding 
requests for military assets. 
  The first group focuses on the causes for the flood and the steps that need to be taken to 
contain further flooding. The group is joined remotely by civil and hydrological engineering 
consultants in the UK and is attended by engineering specialists from within the military and 
humanitarian community. The group is primarily responsible for undertaking an assessment 
of the dam, the reasons for its collapse and the remedial strategies that can be undertaken 
to reduce the risk of further flooding. As part of its analysis, the group requires information 
about  the  purpose  of  the  dam  and  the  likely  amount  of  flood  water  contained  in  the 
reservoir.  This  information  is  largely  derived  from  satellite  imagery  and  geo-spatial 
databases, which indicate an increase in reservoir capacity in recent months due to melting 
winter snow. In order to predict the likely extent of the flood they require information about 
the topography of the local terrain and information from weather forecasts about the risk of 
future rainfall that may exacerbate the flood situation. This meteorological information is 
sourced from weather reports for the Ghazni region. Background information about the 
reservoir,  the  dam  and  the  river  drainage  region  for  the  river  Ghazni  are  all  important 
considerations here
29. Any information relevant to the causes for the flood  is important. 
Satellite imagery and news reports about the flood situation in Ghazni suggest that a 
blockage to the Ghazni River in the vicinity of the city is contributing to the flood, especially 
flooding within the city itself. This information indicates that one remedial strategy is to 
                                                            
29 Note that meteorological reports for the Ghazni province itself are not necessarily adequate because the 
drainage  basin  of  the  Ghazni  River  may  extend  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  (independently  delimited) 
political region. UNCLASSIFIED 
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remove the blockage of the river, but this may cause further flooding to, as yet unaffected, 
downstream regions. The use of sand bags is ruled out because it is believed that this will 
divert the flood water to unaffected regions or intensify the problem in already flooded 
areas. The group considers strategies for temporarily repairing the dam or stemming the 
water flow from the reservoir. In order to accomplish this, further information about the 
structural  integrity  of  the  dam  is  required  and  this  necessitates  the  retrieval  of 
reconnaissance photographs from both surveillance aircraft and satellite imagery as well as 
perhaps ground reports from dispatched personnel. It is decided that engineering personnel 
will be dispatched to the dam via military airlift to make ‘on-the-ground’ visual inspections.  
  The second group is led by representatives of the WHO and focuses on the current health 
situation and likely health impacts of the disaster. This group aims to determine the health 
risk posed by the flood and the impact this has on the nature of relief efforts. Based on the 
extent of the flood it is predicted that wells within the region may have been contaminated 
and that the risk of both water- and vector-borne diseases is therefore high. Risk factors for 
a number of types of diseases are assessed based on information about possible vector 
agents and predisposing factors. This information influences decisions about the type of 
medical supplies that may be required in the course of the relief effort. The number of 
people  affected  by  the  flood  indicates  the  amount  of  medical  supplies  and  number  of 
medical personnel required for the prospective mission. The team decides that causalities 
requiring emergency treatment will be transported to a field hospital in Kabul. If possible a 
temporary  morgue  is  to  be  established  in  Ghazni  to  store  recovered  bodies.  The  team 
requires information about the likely contamination of the local water supplies. Any reports 
(from  news  agencies  or  otherwise)  about  causalities  (number  and  severity),  as  well  as 
estimates of the number of fatalities are relevant here as is information about the number 
of livestock in the affected region, since animal carcasses may also serve as a source of flood 
water contamination. 
  The third team, led by the WFP, focuses on the requirement for food and non-food items. 
Based on information about the number of people involved in the crisis it is possible to 
derive an initial estimate of the number of food items required. The extent of damage to 
homes and properties indicates a requirement for shelter, blankets and plastic sheeting. 
Information  about  the  extent  of  structural  damage  within  Ghazni  is  provided  largely  by 
satellite imagery. Information about the expected meteorological conditions, as well as the 
seasonal average temperature (both day and night) serves as a further constraint on the 
types of aid resources to be supplied. It is decided that temporary emergency shelter will be 
provided in a refugee camp on the outskirts of Ghazni. The location of the camp is informed 
by information about the extent of the flood water, the risk associated with future flooding 
and the viability of transport and supply routes to and from the affected region. Based on 
information about the flood damage within Ghazni it is anticipated that individuals in the 
worst  affected  regions,  as  well  as  survivors  from  the  surrounding  rural  regions  will  be 
evacuated to this camp. The number of people affected by the flood informs estimates 
about the likely size of the camp and the scale of the relief effort required
30. 
  The fourth team is responsible for assessing the demand for fresh water and the amount of 
fresh water supplies required by the relief effort. The extent of the flood indicates that wells 
used for drinking water may have been contaminated and thus water testing kits may be 
required to assess the suitability of drinking water for human consumption. Some of these 
kits may need to be distributed to outlying rural communities that fall within the water table 
                                                            
30 It is worth noting that the scenario depicts a convoy of IDPs moving from the south towards Ghazni in the 
early stages of the scenario. This relief planning exercise needs to anticipate this likely influx of people and 
plan the relief effort accordingly. UNCLASSIFIED 
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of  the  flooded  regions.  The  team  also  concludes  that  water  purification  tablets  may  be 
required for distribution to outlying communities. 
  The  fifth  group  is  responsible  for  planning  the  search  and  rescue  effort  as  well  as  the 
evacuation  of  people  from  both  rural  and  urban  areas.  This  group  is  joined  by 
representatives of coalition forces based on a request from the HC. The military offer to 
provide  Blackhawk  helicopters  for  civilian  evacuation  and  airborne  search  and  rescue; 
however, the humanitarian representatives reject this offer based on the previous use of 
this platform in combat operations. Finally, it is decided that ICRC helicopters will be used 
for SAR (Search and Rescue) operations, since these are visibly marked and recognized as 
humanitarian aid vehicles. Approval from military authorities is required since they have 
secured complete control of the airspace in the theatre of operations and the presence of 
civilian airborne assets poses a potential problem in terms of the tactical air picture. In 
particular, there is  a  need to  avoid inadvertent targeting of neutral aircraft by coalition 
forces who continue to conduct AEW (Airborne Early Warning) and air strike missions over 
Afghanistan. Situation awareness in this context is thus a key anti-fratricidal measure. The 
successful  planning  of  the  SAR  effort  requires  approximate  estimates  of  the  number  of 
people likely to be stranded in flooded regions. 
  The sixth group is responsible for assessing the security situation in the affected region. The 
aim of this group is to assess the risk associated with the relief effort, the likely resource 
requirements in terms of military personnel and equipment, and the impact the disaster has 
on ongoing military operations. The key information input for this group is the history of 
previous conflict incidents in the area and surrounding region, intelligence reports about 
ongoing military operations, evidence of civil disorder within Ghazni, and other security-
related  information,  such  as  minefields  and  UXO  (Unexploded  Ordnance).  An  important 
information input for this team concerns the nature of previous military operations in this 
region.  An  analysis  of  this  information  reveals  that  coalition  forces  conducted  air  strike 
operations against Taliban forces in Ghazni in the early stages of the conflict and there is 
thus a considerable risk of UXO in the form of cluster bombs in an around Ghazni. The extent 
of such campaigns in the vicinity of Ghazni airport prohibits any relief activity in that region.  
  The seventh group is responsible for assessing the transport situation. The aim of this group 
is  to  assess  the  transport  infrastructure  of  the  region  affected  by  the  flood  and  to 
understand which transport routes are deemed impassable. Information of relevance here 
concerns the various land routes into and out of the affected region, the likely impact of the 
flood  on  these  routes  and  whether  there  are  any  constraints  in  terms  of  the  transit  of 
particular types of vehicles along them. The primary source of information for this task is 
satellite imagery and background information about the transport infrastructure within the 
region, although there is a clear operational requirement to obtain more information about 
the integrity of transport routes. There is considerable concern about the security situation 
with respect to the transit of aid supplies to the affected region. Based on the prevailing 
security situation the military authorities advocate the use of armed escorts for the relief 
convoy, but representatives from the ICRC are strongly opposed to this option and threaten 
to  withdraw  from  the  relief  effort.  In  order  to  balance  the  need  to  establish  a  secure 
operating  environment  and  simultaneously  to  preserve  the  perceived  neutrality  and 
impartiality  of  humanitarian  agencies,  the  HC  requests  that  military  defence  assets  be 
forward deployed into the area in order to establish a secure environment for the transport 
or  relief  supplies.  In  response  to  this  request  the  coalition  commander  sanctions  the 
dispatch of a battalion from the 12 Mechanized Brigade (based in Kabul) along Route 104 to 
undertake reconnaissance activities and to secure the highway for the transit of a relief 
convoy. This battalion is subsequently able to provide field reports regarding the structural 
integrity of roads in the vicinity of Ghazni. Air transport is considered to be a relatively UNCLASSIFIED 
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unconstrained means of transport, although there are limits on the quantity of supplies that 
can be provided by this means. In addition, the risk of missile attacks from insurgent groups 
is a possibility, so information about recent conflict or militia activity in any of the regions 
associated with proposed transport routes is required. Intelligence information about the 
likely weapons capabilities of hostile forces operating in this region is deemed relevant to 
the use of airlift operations, since only certain types of weapons capability will provide a 
threat to the use of airborne assets. The type of aircraft to be used for aid distribution is 
constrained by the accessibility of the region in terms of landing strips. In fact Ghazni has an 
airport, but the knowledge store indicates that this airport was the target of allied air strikes 
early on in the military campaign and details about these air strikes indicate that the airport 
will not support landings by fixed wing aircraft. This limits the use of air cargo transport to 
rotary wing aircraft. 
Following the deliberations of the working group, information needs to be shared between the 
groups in order to inform the planning process and enable the coordination of the relief effort. 
Planning activities at this stage involve the logistics of the relief effort (where supplies are to be 
sourced from and how they are to be distributed), the likely resource composition of the relief 
effort, the number and type of personnel to be involved in the relief effort
31, etc. Key information 
required at this stage of the planning process relates to the availability of required resources within 
the country  and  the international  community,  largely  in  the  form  of  existing  stockpiles.  The 
knowledge  system  plays  a  role  here  in  terms  of  the  retrieval  of  information  about  what 
humanitarian agencies are operati ng in the region, what their current activities are and what 
resources they possess
32. 
Given the ongoing conflict and plan for post -conflict reconciliation, a primary objective for the 
military is to ‘win hearts and minds’. This necessitates a prompt and efficient emergency response to 
the  disaster,  in  which  the  military  is  seen  to  provide  an  active  and  constructive  role.  It  is  also 
important  that  the  relief  effort  is  undertaken  in  a  manner  that  takes  into  account  the  relative 
cultural sensitivities of the individuals involved. As such, there is a distinct requirement to gather 
background cultural information about the people involved in the disaster, their ethnicity, political 
commitments
33 and language. Such information indicates the requisite level of military involvement 
(as well as the potential problems associated with military involvement), the possibility of conflict, 
the need for cooperation with provincial leadership and the need for support staff in the form of 
translators. It also provides information about the possibility for tension if people from this region 
are temporarily relocated to camps containing a mixture of individuals from different ethnic groups. 
4.3.5  Focus Task Areas 
During this phase of the scenario the knowledge system is required to make inferences about the 
likely effects of the earthquake. For this task the knowledge system agent relies on information 
about the population of a given region, magnitude of the earthquake and the epicentral location of 
the  earthquake.  It  should  be  able  to  infer  that  the  earthquake  is  sufficient  to  cause  structural 
                                                            
31  In  addition  to  aid  supplies  there  is  also  a  requirement  to  ensure  sufficient  capacity  for  the  successful 
deployment of the relief effort. This capacity can assume the form of ancillary equipment and provisions for 
relief staff as well as translators to help enlist the cooperation of provincial leaders. 
32 This is otherwise known as a WDWW (Who’s Doing What Where) analysis. 
33 It is important to be aware of the likely political commitments of the communities affected by the flood as a 
means of anticipating the response of the affected community to military involvement with the relief effort. 
This information is also a key factor in the security assessment of the relief operation.  UNCLASSIFIED 
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damage and that the proximity of a number of settlements to the epicentre of the earthquake 
entails a high probability of civilian causalities. This information is confirmed by surveillance reports 
provided by the military helicopter dispatched to the region. Inferences about the number of people 
affected by the earthquake should be provided by a web service that accepts as inputs the target 
region about which information is required, the magnitude of the earthquake and the epicentral 
location of the earthquake. The information returned by this service indicates the number of people 
affected by the earthquake phenomenon. A similar task could be used to estimate the likely intensity 
of the earthquake using either European or International earthquake intensity scales
34. 
The system is also required to provide estimates of the number of people affected by the flood. For 
this task it requires information about the spatial extent of the flooded region and th e population 
size of the region. In this case the number of people affected by the flood subsumes causalities, 
fatalities and those displaced or made homeless by the flood water. 
As part of the strategic planning activities for the relief effort, the syste m is required to assist with 
the process of needs assessment and relief planning. Based on a characterization of the disaster (the 
type of crisis, the number of people involved, etc.), the system should be able to determine the type 
and quantity of relief  supplies to made available
35. Once these supplies have been identified, the 
system can also assist with the process of sourcing these aid resources by retrieving information 
about which aid agencies are operating in Afghanistan and what aid provisions they  possess, the 
locations of stockpiles and so on. In the case of medical supplies for example, the system may be 
required to identify types of diseases that may be caused by the flood and the types of remedial 
actions that needs to be undertaken in the case of a disease outbreak.  
The system should be able to return estimates of the amount of rainfall for a given region, where the 
region is specified as a task parameter. It should be able to estimate this information based on 
available meteorological data acc umulated from various weather reports. For example, in the 
current scenario, analysts are required to define a region or select a pre -defined region from the 
knowledge store (as an instance of the Region class), e.g. river drainage basin for the river Ghaz ni. 
They are also required to specify a future time period over which the total amount of rainfall will be 
calculated. The value returned by the service is a value indicating the total amount of precipitation in 
millimetres. 
In order to predict the maximum  extent of the flood, the application could provide a visualization 
service based on the terrain topography of a given region. The aim of this service is to indicate the 
extent of flood waters in the specified region given an input parameter that specifies  the total 
amount of rainfall expected across the entire region. The input parameter is used to calculate and 
increase in flood levels and distribution of flood waters across the specified region. This task may 
prove overly complicated for the purposes of  the AKTiveSA demonstration and thus its inclusion 
should not be considered mandatory. 
                                                            
34 Some of this information is already inferred by the GDACS (http://www.gdacs.org/) system and as such it 
may be desirable to simply access the information provided by GDACS where possible, or at least to co-opt this 
inferred information into the AKTiveSA knowledge system output. 
35  The  knowledge  used  for  th e  form  of  reasoning  activity  is  provided  by  the  SPHERE  project 
(http://www.sphereproject.org/). UNCLASSIFIED 
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Finally, the system is required to provide information on transport routes within a given region. The 
system should be able to infer the types of transport vehicle that these transport routes will support 
and whether these transport routes are currently blocked. The system should also be able to return 
any information about damage to these routes that may make them unusable. This is particularly so 
in the case of Ghazni airport, where the incidence of previous military air strikes has made the 
airport unusable for air cargo transport. 
In general there should be a query hierarchy providing access to query services. A similar hierarchy 
can  be  provided  for  reasoning  services.  Once  invoked  these  services  require  information  to  be 
specified by the user regarding the data objects serving as input parameters. These can be selected 
from the individuals defined in the ontology. A service invocation mechanism similar to that used in 
the  CoSAR-TS
36  framework  could  be  used  to  provide  an  implementation  strategy  for  service 
invocation. 
4.4  Emergency Response Phase 
 
Figure 4.11: eResponse Tactical Picture – Deployment of Aid Convoy 
                                                            
36 http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/cosar-ts/ UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of Aid Supplies and SAR Operations UNCLASSIFIED 
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of Aid Supplies and SAR Operations – 3D Relief View 
4.4.1  Time Period 
  30/03/2002 06:00 - 30/04/2002 21:00 
4.4.2  Timeline 
 
Figure 4.14:  eResponse Phase Timeline 
Time  Event  Description 
30/03/2002 06.28  Mine Action Activities  12 Mechanized Brigade surveys the area of the proposed 
relief camp, which will also serve as an operational centre 
for the relief effort, to determine the risk posed by UXO. 
There  is  no  intelligence  information  to  support  the 
presence of land mines, although since Ghazni has been 
the focus of previous air strikes there is a considerable 
risk of cluster bombs. These were previously used against 
Taliban forces in the early stages of the conflict. 
30/03/2002 09.08  Dispatch of Relief Convoy  The  initial  relief  convoy  is  dispatched  from  Kabul  to 
Ghazni. 
30/03/2002 06:00:00 30/03/2002 21:00:00
07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00
09:08 - 13:16
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12:20
Arrival of Relief 
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13:16 - 21:54
Arrival of Evacuees at ZX-1
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Time  Event  Description 
30/03/2002 10:08  Relocation  of  12  Mechanized 
Brigade 
12 Mechanized Brigade are re-positioned to the north of 
Ghazni on standby. 
29/03/2002 12:20  Arrival of Relief Convoy  The relief convoy arrives at the proposed site for the relief 
camp outside Ghazni. 
29/03/2002 13:16  Camp ZX-1 Established  The relief camp is established. It serves an operational 
centre  for  the  relief  effort  and  includes  provisions  for 
displaced persons and medical aid.  
29/03/2002 13.50  Aid Supplies Arrive via Airlift  Additional  aid  supplies  are  delivered  to  ZX-1  via  airlift 
using Chinook helicopters 
29/03/2002 14.24  ICRC  Helicopter  Begins  SAR 
Operations 
SAR operations are undertaken by an ICRC helicopter in 
the rural regions affected by the flood. 
29/03/2002 15:28  Aerial  Distribution  of  Relief 
Supplies 
The  Blackhawk  helicopter  is  re-tasked  with  the  aerial 
distribution of relief supplies to outlying rural regions. It is 
joined in this task by a Sea King helicopter. 
29/03/2002 16:40  Civil Disturbance in Ghazni  Reports emerge of civil unrest in Ghazni in the form of 
mobbing  of  aid  supplies  and  a  number  of  shooting 
incidents. 
29/03/2002 17:34  Military Oversee Aid Distribution  Military  assets  are  called  in  to  oversee  the  distribution 
effort. Ground forces are deployed in Ghazni and Apache 
and Blackhawk helicopters provide air-based surveillance 
and security. 
4.4.3  Figures 
  Figure 4.11 
  Figure 4.12 
  Figure 4.13 
4.4.4  Synopsis 
This  period  is  marked  by  the  distribution  of  humanitarian  aid.  The  humanitarian  relief  effort 
codenamed (Sultan Relief) is initiated. A relief convoy is assembled to supply aid to the affected 
region using the main route from Kabul to Ghazni (Route 104). This route is deemed passable to 
trucks used by the coalition relief effort. The humanitarian agencies wish to set up a relief camp on 
the outskirts of Ghazni to deal with people temporarily made homeless as a result of the flood. Units 
from 12 Mechanized Brigade are deployed into this area well ahead of the arrival of the relief 
convoy in order to secure the area and to investigate the risk with respect to UXO.  
The security situation is deemed sufficiently hazardous for the HC to request an armed escort for the 
relief  convoy  to  Ghazni.  The  reluctance  of  the  ICRC  to  accept  armed  escorts  by  those  directly 
involved in combat operations, namely the US-led coalition forces, necessitates the use of careful 
measures on behalf of the military  to preserve the perceived neutrality of humanitarian actors. 
Eventually, it is decided that military support will be provided to the convoy using airborne assets in 
the form of an Apache helicopter with ground support provided by ISAF elements, which operate 
under a UN mandate. In accordance with IASC guidelines a clear distinction is to be made between 
humanitarian and military escort vehicles in the context of the transport of relief supplies to the 
affected region.  
The relief convoy is deployed to Ghazni at 09.08. On arrival, an operations centre and relief camp is 
established on the outskirts of Ghazni to the north-east (codenamed ZX1). Some aid supplies are 
distributed via airlift into this base using Chinook helicopters requisitioned from the US Army. Aid 
representatives are deployed into Ghazni and the provincial leadership is contacted to assist with 
the  supervision  of  the  support  efforts.  Some  aid  supplies  are  deployed  directly  into  Ghazni. 
Following  the  wish  of  the  humanitarian  agencies  to  operate  without  military  supervision  in  the 
distribution of aid supplies, military agents do not assist with the distribution of aid. A Blackhawk UNCLASSIFIED 
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helicopter is, however, tasked with overseeing the humanitarian relief effort from the air within 
Ghazni. Units from the 12 Mechanised Brigade are re-positioned to the north of Ghazni along Route 
104 on standby. An evacuation operation is initiated to transfer all inhabitants made homeless by 
the flood water to Zulu-Xray.  
The ICRC helicopter begins SAR operations in the  flooded region north of Ghazni and begins to 
transport  rescued  civilians  from  the  rural  regions  into  Zulu-Xray.  The  helicopter  reports  that 
significant numbers of people are made homeless by the flood and this necessitates the deployment 
of aid supplies directly to the affected communities. The humanitarian community wants to deliver 
aid  supplies  by  air  to  these  communities  and  this  requires  close  inter-operation  with  military 
agencies regarding the security of the airspace in the region affected by the flood. Sea King Mk7 and 
Blackhawk helicopters (the one previously tasked with surveillance of the relief distribution effort in 
Ghazni) are enlisted into the aid distribution effort to outlying rural regions.  As the air picture in the 
affected region becomes increasingly busy, the need for situation awareness is heightened. At this 
stage of the scenario, as at other stages, a key operational requirement is an awareness of what 
actors are deployed into the theatre of operations and what they are doing. This is necessary in 
order to avoid inadvertent targeting of neutral assets as well as coalition forces. The tactical picture 
at this juncture in the scenario is highly complicated, featuring a complex mixture of both airborne 
and  land-based  agents  with  different  operational  foci.  This  complexity  is  compounded  by  the 
presence  of  agents  with  very  different  organizational  affiliations  and  roles,  i.e.  US-led  coalition 
forces, ISAF, Afghan civilians, humanitarian agencies and news agency representatives. 
As aid supplies are distributed within Ghazni, the relief camp and surrounding regions, the security 
situation within Ghazni deteriorates. News reports emerge of civil disturbance in Ghazni in the form 
of widespread looting and mobbing of food supply vehicles. It is also reported that a number of 
humanitarians  and  civilians  have  been  the  target  of  shooting  incidents.  While  reports  from 
humanitarian agencies are unable to confirm the use of arms, they do confirm that the situation in 
the vicinity of the aid distribution point is increasingly hostile and threatening. Mobile phones are 
used by humanitarian aid personnel to transmit images of the situation in Ghazni back to base. At 
this point there is a conflict between the interpretations of the situation between the humanitarian 
and military agencies. The military agencies perceive the situation as necessitating the deployment 
of military assets, while the humanitarians perceive the situation as manageable and under control. 
Finally, the military is able to provide the HC with video footage derived from news reports that 
confirms looting and shooting incidents within Ghazni. This is sufficient for the HC to ask for military 
assistance with respect to the security situation in Ghazni. Military personnel, in the form of 12 
Mechanized  Brigade,  are  subsequently  called  on  to  control  the  situation  and  supervise  the 
distribution of food and water in Ghazni. An Apache helicopter is  also called in to  oversee the 
distribution of food aid from the air. All reports about the security situation are monitored to detect 
any worsening of the situation, but the presence of military forces on the scene is sufficient to bring 
the situation under control. 
Throughout  this  phase  of  the  operation  multiple  information  sources  are  monitored  to  provide 
feedback about the success of the operation and acquire information about situation contingencies 
that may require significant re-planning or reorganization of the relief effort. Information of interest 
includes  changes  in  the  flood  levels,  the  meteorological  outlook,  incidences  of  civil  disorder  or 
unrest, military attacks on relief convoys and coalition forces, information about fatalities and the UNCLASSIFIED 
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international response to the disaster. In addition, military agencies are interested in monitoring 
changes in the background level of conflict throughout the country that may indicate civil unrest in 
light  of  the  disaster.  Weather  reports  for  the  local  region  are  monitored  for  evidence  of  any 
precipitation  events  that  might  adversely  affect  the  relief  effort.  The  military  provide  access  to 
further satellite imagery products, although these can only be used at periodic intervals throughout 
the scenario. News reports from various news agencies provide information about the situation in 
Ghazni and elsewhere, including the national and international response to the humanitarian crisis. 
The military’s concern with the political impact of the crisis warrants an interest in all news reports 
that provide information about the flood. They are particularly concerned with the manner in which 
the flood is presented in the media. Any information sources that provide information about the 
disaster  are  relevant  in  this  respect,  including  information  sources  that  may  misrepresent  the 
military’s position or deliberately attempt to misinform the public as a means to undermine political 
support for continued military action. Incidents such as these are deemed relevant to the military’s 
media operations and strategic information campaign. 
4.4.5  Focus Task Areas 
The key focus task area for this phase of the scenario is purely one of situation monitoring. Situation 
awareness is enhanced via the ability to integrate information from multiple sources and to visualize 
the situation in a manner the permits of the juxtaposition of very different situation elements. Users 
of the system at this point should have the capability to view the tactical picture from a variety of 
different perspectives. The humanitarian tactical picture will consist of humanitarian agents and 
their activities, while the military picture will consist primarily of military assets (both land and air 
components). It should, however, be possible to arbitrarily compose any form of tactical picture 
based on semantic queries, which indicate the types of situation elements of interest with respect to 
the  monitoring  objectives  of  an  observer  agent.  In  addition,  this  phase  of  the  scenario  clearly 
demonstrates the use and exploitation of a number of diverse information sources, which are used 
to alert agencies of the occurrence of particular events and are exchanged with other agencies in 
order to coordinate activities and improve operational effectiveness (this is clearly the case when 
military agents consolidate information from  the Blackhawk helicopter and news reports in order to 
provide evidence of the worsening security situation to humanitarian agencies). 
This phase of the scenario does not feature any conventional rules-based reasoning. It does however 
avail itself of the considerable power afforded by subsumption reasoning in terms of the automatic 
classification of situation elements. The ability to exploit the semantic meta-data associated with 
information  products  is  also  crucial  in  terms  of  identifying  the  semantic  referents  of  diverse 
information sources, such as field reports, imagery and video products. As such, this phase of the 
scenario  provides  an  opportunity  to  highlight  the  advantages  of  semantic  web  technology  with 
respect  to  information  integration,  semiometric  filtering  and  improved  search  and  retrieval 
capabilities. 
4.5  Post-Emergency & Durable Solution Phase 
4.5.1  Time Period 
  01/04/2002 00:00 - 30/06/2002 00:00 
4.5.2  Timeline 
None UNCLASSIFIED 
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4.5.3  Figures 
  None 
4.5.4  Synopsis 
Humanitarian relief efforts continue. At this stage of the scenario the flood water levels are deemed 
stable. The majority of military units are removed from the crisis zone, although a battalion of the 12 
Mechanized brigade remains in situ to oversee relief distribution efforts and local security. A medical 
clinic  is  established  at  camp  Zulu-Xray  to  treat  the  wounded  and  deal  with  possible  disease 
outbreaks. Any incidence of water borne diseases such as cholera, typhoid fever and Hepatitis A are 
immediately reported to the commanding authorities at HIC. 
This phase of the scenario is concerned with an assessment of the long term impact of the flood. A 
working group with input from subject matter experts from multiple disciplines is established to 
assess the long term effects of the flood, the actions required throughout the recovery phase and 
the future assistance required by inhabitants of the region. The key issues for the working group 
relate to the following: 
  There  has  been  a  substantial  loss  of  irrigation  water  from  the  reservoir.  This  reservoir 
provided extensive irrigation support to multiple communities, some of whom are currently 
unaffected by the flood. The irrigation served not only as a supply of drinking water, but also 
as a supply of water for agricultural purposes. As such it is expected that future crop yields in 
the region may be affected which may result in long term food insecurity and economic 
problems  for  the  region.  This  is  a  source  of  concern,  not  only  from  a  humanitarian 
perspective, but also from the perspective of the campaign to win ‘hearts and minds’. There 
is a need to avoid civil unrest or undue economic hardship in the post-war period, which 
may intensify ill feeling against the allied powers.  
  Related to  the previous  point is  the  long term  damage done to  agricultural  land in  the 
immediate vicinity of the flood. Thousands of hectares of arable land have been washed 
away destroying young wheat crops, which is a valuable economic and food resource in the 
province.  In  addition,  the  flood  has  destroyed  orchards,  which  may  take  years  to  fully 
recover and may hamper the economic recovery of the region in the wake of the conflict 
period. Significant numbers of livestock have also been destroyed by the flood 
  Although  the  flood  waters  have  receded  there  is  still  a  risk  of  disease  due  to  the 
contamination of fresh water wells used for drinking water. There is a need to continually 
monitor  the  viability  of  these  fresh  water  supplies  in  order  to  prevent  future  disease 
outbreaks.  
  The  flood  has  destroyed  thousands  of  homes  and  shops  in  the  city  of  Ghazni,  which 
previously served as a major cultural centre. A failure to address the economic impact of the 
flood, vis-à-vis the destruction of Ghazni, may contribute to long term resentment against 
the occupying forces and destabilise future peace efforts.  
4.5.5  Focus Task Areas 
Knowledge processing at this stage of the scenario could be directed towards assessing the likely 
impacts  of  the  flood  in  terms  of  future  food  insecurity  and  economic  hardship.  This  will  not, 
however, be a central focus for demonstrating the capability of the AKTiveSA TDS at this point. 
Rather the emphasis will be on access to information required for these kinds of decision-making 
capabilities, namely information about land use, the type of crops produced, the importance of 
these  crop  products  to  the  local  economy,  etc.  From  a  situation  monitoring  perspective  the UNCLASSIFIED 
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emphasis should be on detecting incidences of disease. For instance, humanitarian agencies will 
require notification about all incidences of disease in the flooded region and they should be able to 
view this information in graphical format in order to detect a rapid increase in disease cases.  UNCLASSIFIED 
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5  Background Information 
This section reviews the information and knowledge backdrop of the scenario presented in this 
report  based  on  current  guidelines  and  SOPs  (Standard  Operating  Procedures)  adopted  by 
humanitarian agencies. The scenario presented in this document makes a number of assumptions 
regarding the extent of cooperation with military agencies, knowledge and reasoning capabilities of 
executive decision makers, the kinds of information exploited in the context of decision-making 
tasks and the institutional structures and procedures for exchanging information and coordinating 
activities. This section aims to provide background information relevant to these assumptions based 
on current codes of practice and the mandates of actors featured in the scenario. 
5.1  Humanitarian Knowledge-Intensive Tasks 
The deployment of an operationally-effective aid solution incorporates a number of knowledge-
intensive tasks, which are typically completed by agents in a collaborative fashion. Besides the issues 
related to disaster preparedness
37, prediction and disaster notification, a coordinated relief effort 
typically entails the following task components: 
  Situation Assessment: an assessment of the situation including what has happened and 
where. Much of the information required for this activity can be gleaned from reports, such 
as SITREPs (Situation Reports), and physical descriptions of the phenomenon responsible for 
the emergency situation. 
  Needs Assessment: an assessment of what needs to be done in terms of relief actions and 
supply requirements in order to minimize further harm and alleviate human suffering. 
  Relief  Planning:  the  actual  planning  of  a  relief  effort  in  terms  sourcing,  delivery  and 
dissemination of aid supplies. 
  Future  Vulnerability  Assessment:  an  assessment  of  the  long  term  implications  of  the 
disaster with respect to future humanitarian action.  
5.1.1  Needs Assessment 
In order to provide effective humanitarian relief, aid agencies need access to reliable information 
about the implications of a humanitarian emergency in terms of its resource requirements. The 
process of determining the kind and quantity of resources required to deal with a humanitarian 
emergency is referred to as ‘needs assessment’ and its aim is to understand the demands of an 
emergency  in  terms  of  the  following  types  of  activities  and  resources  (Post-Disaster  Damage 
Assessment and Need Analysis, 2000)
38: 
  Search and Rescue 
  Evacuation 
                                                            
37 This topic is not covered in this report. 
38 Needs assessment also tends to involve an element of prediction in which there is a need to identify major 
secondary threats to survivors, such as secondary flooding or landslides, damage to chemical plants or fuel 
storage fires, etc. (Disaster Emergency Needs Assessment, 2000). 
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  Protection 
  Medical and Health 
  Shelter and Clothing 
  Food (including cooking utensils and cooking fuel 
  Water 
  Sanitation 
  Lifeline Systems (e.g. communications, power supplies, transport, etc.) 
The needs assessment process is informed by the results of a situation assessment (a description of 
what has happened). Some of the data required for the needs assessment is already available in the 
form  of  baseline  data  (maps,  population  statistics,  etc),  but  often  these  baseline  data  must  be 
supplemented  by  real-time  information  (mostly  in  the  form  of  incoming  reports  from  various 
sources after the disaster). 
In quantifying needs it is often appropriate to use internationally accepted standards for assigning 
resource  requirements  based  on  the  characteristics  of  the  emergency  situation.  The  AKTiveSA 
project  relies  on  the  standards  promulgated  by  the  SPHERE  project
39. The SPHERE Handbook 
(Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 2003) includes information on 
the following sectors: 
  Water Supply and Sanitation 
  Nutrition 
  Food Aid 
  Shelter and Site Planning 
  Health Services 
In addition, to these sectors, assessment teams may also be required to collect information on 
personal and household needs; agricultural, economic and infrastructure damage; and the political 
and  security  situation,  etc.  In  some  cases  this  additional  information  is  important  in  terms  of 
assessing  future  vulnerability  (see  Section  5.1.3)  after  the  emergency  phase  of  the  disaster  has 
ended. 
In  general,  needs  assessment  should  be  an  ongoing  and  repetitive  process  (Disaster  Emergency 
Needs  Assessment,  2000).  This  reflects  the  fact  that  circumstances,  information  availability,  and 
emergency needs change over time. When and how often different assessments are conducted will 
depend  on  the  type  of  disaster,  available  resources  and  specific  information  needs.  Generally, 
information should be collected more frequently the more a situation changes and when there are 
critical developments, such as a secondary disaster, new population movements or an epidemic 
outbreak. 
Given the importance of situation information for needs assessment, it is important for responding 
agencies to trust the information they receive. Particular concerns relate to the expertise of those 
involved in the assessment and the possibility for bias. The ICRC, for example, recommends the 
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evaluation of all assessment information with respect to the following criteria (Disaster Emergency 
Needs Assessment, 2000): 
  Who did the assessment? What experience/expertise do they have in this area? 
  How much time did the assessment team spend on-site? Did they visit the site? 
  Whom did the assessment team interview? What important beneficiary groups did they fail 
to consider? 
  If the assessment report contains statistical data, are they primary or secondary data? If they 
are secondary data, what is the original source? Does the team have the expertise to judge 
the validity of statistical information? If not, which experts should they consult? 
  What  is  the  possibility  of  a  segment  of  the  population  (e.g.  an  ethnic,  class,  national, 
geographic, religious, or vulnerable group) being inadequately assessed? 
  Considering  the  source  of  information,  what  biases  may  be  reflected  in  the  assessment 
findings?  
  Does  the  NGO  (Non-Governmental  Organization)  or  government  have  an  interest  in 
presenting biased information? 
  What  are  the  government’s  interests  in  presenting  biased  information?  Does  the 
government’s information appear misleading? 
There is clearly a role here for knowledge-based evaluation of certainty assigned to information 
based on the relative trust invested in information sources. In addition, it is likely that mechanisms 
of information fusion can be used to evaluate the reliability of assessment information, a mechanism 
that is analogous to the ICRC proposed technique of ‘triangulation’
40 (Disaster Emergency Needs 
Assessment, 2000). 
A variety of tools exist for performing needs assessment. These mostly assume the form of checklists 
and forms. The Rapid Needs Assessment Checklist of the ICRC is reproduced in Appendix B illustrates 
the forms used by the ICRC to undertake needs assessment. Such resources provide a valuable 
source of information regarding the information requirements of the needs assessment process. 
Original copies of these forms are available from the ICRC ‘Disaster Emergency Needs Assessment’ 
(2000) manual. 
5.1.2  Relief Planning 
Relief planning entails the translation of humanitarian needs (resulting from needs assessment) into 
an operational plan for aid delivery. The task of planning the relief effort entails the ability to identify 
the sources for aid supplies (perhaps in the form of organization-specific stockpiles) as well as to 
determine the needed capacity to use these resources effectively. Identifying the needed capacity of 
a relief effort is important because it is easy for planning efforts to focus on the resource aspects of 
an emergency situation while ignoring the capacity of an organization to effectively deploy those 
resources. The UNHCR, for example, comments: 
“Capacity  is  the  internal  organizational  capability  which  includes  planning, 
staffing,  structure,  systems,  procedures,  guidelines,  information  flow, 
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communication, decision-making and administrative support. Resources are the 
financial  and  human  resources,  relief  materials,  support  equipment,  tools  and 
facilities…Capacity is an aspect of emergency management which is sometimes 
not given adequate priority. Resources are often given more emphasis during both 
the planning and operational stages since they are a more tangible element. But it 
is  capacity  that  determines  the  quality  of  an  emergency  response.  A  well 
capacitated  organization  is  more  likely  to  be  able  to  mount  a  credible  and 
effective  operation,  attracting  the  necessary  resources.”  (Handbook  For 
Emergencies, 2001; pg. 30) 
In general, the Gap Identification chart is an essential ingredient of relief planning. The chart enables 
an analyst to allocate responsibilities effectively and allocate gaps in resource allocation with respect 
to different aid sectors (see Table 5-1). 
  Site 1  Site 2  Site 3 
Overall Site 
Management 
     
Protection & Security       
Registration       
Shelter       
Water       
Health       
Nutrition       
Sanitation       
Distribution       
Table 5-1: Blank Gap Identification Chart 
5.1.3  Future Vulnerability Assessment 
Future vulnerability assessment concerns the long term impacts of a humanitarian emergency in 
terms  of  the  recovery  and  rehabilitation  of  the  affected  communities.  The  current  scenario 
highlights the need for this kind of assessment in terms of the long-term economic and agricultural 
impact of the flood on the affected regions. The aim of future vulnerability assessments are to 
provide an indication of the long term humanitarian aid required by a community, in terms of both 
supplies and aid actions, as well as an indication of the time period over which such aid is to be 
provided. 
5.2  Use of Satellite Imagery 
The  scenario  described  in  this  document  features  the  exploitation  of  satellite  imagery  for  the 
purposes  of  situation  assessment  and  relief  planning.  A  number  of  humanitarian  organizations 
currently  exploit  satellite  images  for  similar  purposes  in  the  context  of  relief  efforts  and  this 
exploitation is predicted to grow as commercial satellite products become more accessible and cost 
effective (Bjorgo, 2002). Both the recent UN General Assembly's "Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations" (A/55/305 - S/2000/809, also referred to as the ‘Brahimi Report’)
41 and 
"Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations: 
Report  of  the  Secretary-General"  (A/55/82  -  S/2000/61)  acknowledge  the  importance  of  using 
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modern  technologies,  including  GIS  (Geographic  Information  System)  and  related  tools  such  as 
satellite  imagery,  during  complex  and  humanitarian  emergencies.  To  this  end  the  UNHCR,  in 
coordination with OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), has 
recently implemented a new initiative for the increased use of Landsat 7 derived information for the 
benefit of the humanitarian community, within the framework of the GIST (Geographic Information 
Support Team) initiative. This work includes developing and updating a web site
42 in cooperation 
with  the  University  of  Georgia  (US)  and  its  Information  Technology  Outrea ch  Service  ( ITOS), 
dedicated to the free sharing of Landsat 7 satellite imagery as part of a broader data repository. The 
web site stores a significant amount of useful Landsat 7 imagery, which is regularly updated for the 
benefit of the global humanitarian relief community. The site is expected to contribute more quality 
geographic information and, accordingly, to increase the use of  EO (Earth Observation) technology 
within the humanitarian community. Recently, the UN also established UNOSAT
43 to provide the 
humanitarian community with access to satellite imagery and GIS services.  UNOSAT is implemented 
by the UN Institute for Training and Research ( UNITAR) and managed by the UN Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS). The goal of UNOSAT is to make satellite imag ery and geographic information 
easily accessible to the humanitarian community and to experts worldwide working to reduce 
disasters and plan sustainable development. UNOSAT acquires satellite images from all commercial 
providers. 
The GIST, an informal supp ort group for sharing geographic information between actors in the 
humanitarian relief community, has developed a set of core standards for information sharing  (King 
& Dilley, 2001). These standards follow the Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting Exchange 
(SHARE) approach, which encourages actors to include: 
1.  geographic reference or location information on where data were collected;  
2.  time-stamp information indicating when data were collected, and where suitable, at what 
frequency new data are collected;  
3.  metadata (information about the data themselves), including information on sources of 
data, what the data values represent, which standards were used, and how the data was 
measured or derived.  
One  of  the  main  benefits  of  satellite  imagery  is  that  service  providers  already  follow  these 
standards
44. This makes satellite data particularly suitable to be included in GIS and to be shared 
with other actors. Hence, there is no need to develop new formats for the relief community. 
For the most part, humanitarian agencies tend to use commercial satellite products rather than 
military sources; however, military sources of imagery are often preferr ed to commercial sources 
because they offer greater detail and in some cases the images have already been interpreted and 
are ready to use (Bjorgo, 2002).  
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5.3  Civil-Military Interoperation in Relief Efforts 
5.3.1  Overview 
Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  period  military  forces  have  been  increasingly  involved  in  crisis 
management and disaster relief efforts. The ICRC (The ICRC and Civil-Military Conflict Relations in 
Armed Conflict, 2001) proposes a number of reasons to account for this increased participation: 
  Reforms in the armed forces: The traditional emphasis on territorial defence has to some 
extent shifted to other functions, including peace support operations and emergency aid in 
natural disasters. States are thus seeking new ways to devote their military capabilities to 
new tasks.  
  The changing nature of conflicts: Geopolitical developments over the past ten years have 
triggered a new type of conflict. The end of the Cold War brought several proxy wars to a 
close, but it also means that weak States have become more vulnerable to internal strife 
and,  in  some  cases,  have  disintegrated  into  failed  States  torn  apart  by  armed  combat 
between a host of local power centres. One of the most disturbing features of these new 
conflicts  is  that,  very  often,  civilians  are  no  longer  “caught  in  the  crossfire”  but  are 
deliberately targeted on account of their group identity. The high price paid by the civilian 
population and the destabilization of entire regions has given rise to a greater need for 
military intervention to restore peace and security. 
  Developing  Role  of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council:  The  United  Nations  Security 
Council has taken on a new importance. The Permanent Members are much more likely now 
than  during  the  Cold  War  to  reach  a  consensus  in  favour  of  military  intervention  on 
humanitarian grounds, or at least to abstain from using their veto. This has provided greater 
scope not only for peace-keeping but also for peace-enforcement. 
The UNHCR (Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 2001) also identifies a 
number  of  factors  encouraging  increased  participation  of  military  actors  in  relief  efforts.  These 
include: 
  Military factors: humanitarian actions may be undertaken as part of an effort to secure the 
good will of the population within which a force is operating. This is otherwise known as Civil 
Affairs Operations (CAOs). 
  Institutional factors: military forces may be tasked with peace support and relief operations 
because there is a need to foster the impression that they are active during periods of low 
threat. 
  Political factors: military involvement may be encouraged as part of a public relations effort 
directed towards constituencies in the sending state. 
5.3.2  Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Involvement 
There  is  a  widespread  unease  in  the  humanitarian  community  regarding  the  trend  towards 
increasing military involvement in humanitarian affairs. International humanitarian law has sought 
to build on the distinction between the military domain and the non-military domain, seeking to 
create what is now sometimes referred to as the ‘humanitarian space’ (The ICRC and Civil-Military 
Conflict Relations in Armed Conflict, 2001). In seeking to consolidate this humanitarian space, the use 
or involvement of military assets for humanitarian relief has generally been regarded as undesirable, 
threatening  to  compromise  the  neutrality,  impartiality  and  other  humanitarian  principles  of 
humanitarian actors. The potential for perceived loss of neutrality is a particular cause for concern UNCLASSIFIED 
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since it can result in relief workers becoming the targets of hostile activity and being denied access 
to the affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian crises. 
In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming direct targets of the 
belligerents. 
Despite these concerns within the humanitarian community, there is also a recognition of the value 
of military forces in at least some aspects of humanitarian relief operations. The military often have 
the  capability  to  help  secure  an  enabling  environment  on  the  ground  in  which  humanitarian 
activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have the practical means to assist in 
the delivery of aid efforts, e.g. the rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, 
logistics and supplies. They may also serve as information providers with respect to situation and 
needs  assessment
45. There is thus a need to counterbalance the concerns of the humanitarian 
community  with  respect  to  military  involvement,  against  the  wi der  concern  to  expedite 
humanitarian action in an operationally effective manner within a relatively secure operating 
environment.  
5.3.3  Guidelines on Civil-Military Interoperation 
Whatever the concerns about the effective blurring of the military and humanitarian spaces, the fact 
is that humanitarian actors often need to inter-operate with military agencies, perhaps with respect 
to the coordination of their activities and the exchange of information, even if these efforts do not 
necessarily aim to co-opt military assets into an ongoing relief effort. The operational necessity of 
this  inter-operation  has  prompted  the  IASC  to  propose  the  following  ‘operating  principles’  with 
respect to the use of all military assets in support of humanitarian operations (The Use of Military 
and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations, 1995): 
1.  Decisions  to  accept  military  assets  must  be  made  by  humanitarian  organizations,  not 
political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria. Requests for military assets 
must be made by the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator. 
2.  Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative 
and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset 
must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last 
resort. 
3.  A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. 
The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian 
organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements 
for  the  military  asset  itself.  To  the  extent  possible,  the  military  asset  should  operate 
unarmed and be civilian in appearance. 
4.  Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure 
that  they  respect  the  code  of  conduct  and  principles  of  the  humanitarian  organization 
responsible for that deployment. 
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5.  The  large-scale  involvement  of  military  personnel  in  the  direct  delivery  of  humanitarian 
assistance should be avoided. 
6.  Any  use  of  military  assets  should  ensure  that  the  humanitarian  operation  retains  its 
international and multilateral character. 
In general there is a recognition that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or 
cannot  be  obtained  in  a  timely  manner  to  meet  urgent  humanitarian  needs,  military  and  civil 
defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the aforementioned 
guidelines.  
The nature of the cooperation between humanitarian and military agencies may assume a number 
of forms. The mandate of the UN peace keeping force in Afghanistan, i.e. ISAF, for example, includes 
limited  support  to  the  UN  humanitarian  and  recovery  effort  and  it  has  a  CIMIC  (Civil-Military 
Cooperation) group to perform this function. Information can be shared freely with ISAF. ISAF may 
also be used to  provide indirect assistance (e.g. the transport of goods, or the maintenance of 
camps, schools and other facilities where beneficiaries are present) or infrastructure support (e.g. 
the construction or repair of bridges, roads, airfields, power, communications or other facilities that 
benefit the population but involve limited contact with the beneficiary population).  
5.3.4  Military Escorts 
In  general  the  greatest  area  of  controversy  regarding  the  inter-operation  of  military  and 
humanitarian agencies concerns the use of military forces for security purposes, e.g. the provision of 
armed escorts. Several factors affect the security situation: complex emergencies by definition entail 
civil  strife  and  high  levels  of  violence;  landmines,  unexploded  ordnance,  and  small  arms  are 
prevalent in communities and cities where humanitarian agencies operate; also because the number 
of  NGOs  operating  in  complex  emergencies  has  steadily  increased  over  the  past  decade,  the 
probability  of  incidents  involving  relief  workers  has  also  increased  thereby  escalating  security 
concerns.  The  use  of  military  escorts  for  humanitarian  convoys  has  both  advantages  and 
disadvantages. On the positive side, military escorts provide deterrence against potential aggressors. 
Where armoured vehicles are used in the convoy escort, greater physical security (not to mention 
psychological security) is offered. In addition, in the actual event of an attack, escorts provide a self-
defensive  capability.  On  the  negative  side,  however,  escorted  convoys  tend  to  move  slowly, 
especially  where  heavy  armoured  vehicles  are  used.  Aggressors  also  tend  not  to  differentiate 
between convoys and their escorts, and may therefore target unarmed humanitarian workers. 
Within the community of the humanitarian organizations outside the UN there is a  broad view 
regarding  the  extent  to  which  the  military  should  be  used  for  armed  escorts  of  humanitarian 
convoys. The Red Cross Movement, for example, holds that: 
“as a general principle any armed protection for any component of Movement is 
in conflict with the following Fundamental principles: humanity, independence, 
impartiality  and  neutrality.”  (cited  in,  Use  of  Military  or  Armed  Escorts  for 
Humanitarian Convoys, 2001; pg 8) 
Other organizations, especially the implementing partners of the UN agencies, have no such policy 
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In  2001,  the  IASC  advocated  the  following  criteria  regarding  the  use  of  armed  escorts  for 
humanitarian relief convoys: 
1.  Sovereignty. The sovereign power or local controlling authority (‘the local authorities’) is 
unwilling or unable to provide a secure environment without the use of military or armed 
escorts. 
2.  Need. The level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian assistance would 
lead to unacceptable human suffering, yet assistance cannot be delivered without the use of 
military or armed escorts. 
3.  Safety. Armed or military escorts can be provided in a way which would provide the credible 
deterrent  needed  to  enhance  the  safety  of  humanitarian  personnel  and  the  capacity  to 
provide  assistance  to  intended  beneficiaries  without  compromising  the  security  of 
beneficiaries and other local populations. 
4.  Sustainability. The use of an armed or military escort would not compromise the longer-
term capacity of the organization safely and effectively to fulfil its mandate. 
If the use of armed escorts is deemed necessary, then the relationship between the humanitarian 
community and external military forces should be based on the following guiding principles (Use of 
Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 2001): 
1.  The primacy of the humanitarian organizations in humanitarian work. In the first instance, 
humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military 
organizations have an immediate role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should be 
in the provision of a secure environment and/or in the provision of logistics support when 
requested by humanitarian organizations. 
2.  Primacy of humanitarian criteria. The decision to request or accept the use of military or 
armed  escorts  must  be  made  by  humanitarian  organizations,  not  political  or  military 
authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. 
3.  Humanitarian  identity.  Humanitarian  convoys  must  retain  their  civilian  nature  and 
character.  Other  than  the  vehicles,  weapons  and  personnel  providing  the  escorts,  the 
convoys  must  remain  exclusively  humanitarian  and  armed  personnel  should  remain  in 
separate vehicles. In order to give visibility to the civilian character of humanitarian convoys, 
vehicles  other  than  the  ones  used  to  transport  armed  escorts  may  be  fitted  with  “No 
Weapons” stickers. 
Of course, issues of security and insecurity are relative. A situation that might be a security concern 
for the military may not be one for the International Committee of the Red Cross or for a local 
organization.  Interpreting  the  situation  and  transmitting  an  assessment  about  the  nature  and 
perception of threats and vulnerabilities specifically to relief organizations is an important role that 
CA personnel can perform in support of humanitarian security. 
5.3.5  Civil-Military Communication 
In order to successfully coordinate their activities, communicative interfaces between military and 
humanitarian actors needs to be established at an institutional level. This is generally problematic 
because  of  the  differing  cultural  and  institutional  mandates  of  the  military  and  humanitarian 
community: 
“On one level, basic terms often differ impeding communications.  The military 
has its own acronym-filled jargon just as humanitarians do.  CA personnel are UNCLASSIFIED 
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taught one definition for “refugee” while there is different one common among 
humanitarians. Humanitarians who arrived in Afghanistan, for example, familiar 
with CMOCs from other conflicts were confronted with CHLCs.  On another level, 
communication  hardware  systems  differ.  Maps  are  not  common  and 
humanitarians  rely  on  satellite  phones  and  e-mail  which  CMOC’s  do  not 
necessarily have.” (James, 2003) 
Military agencies typically provide points of contact and coordination for humanitarian agencies as 
part  of  their  Civil  Affairs  procedures.  Civil  Affairs  units  act  as  a  liaison  between  the  civilian 
inhabitants  of  a  war  zone  or  disaster  area  and  the  military  presence,  both  informing  the  local 
commander of the status of the civilian populace as well as effecting assistance to locals by either 
coordinating military operations with NGOs or distributing aid and supplies directly to vulnerable 
communities. As part of CAO, military agencies will typically aim to establish CIMICs or CMOCs, 
which serve as the focus point for communication between the military and humanitarian actors. 
Typically, located within military headquarters, these units provide a convenient focus for civilian 
agencies' requests for military assistance. They also have the significant advantage of providing a 
meeting place where all members of the military chain of command can have access to civilian 
actors and organizations. For civilian actors, they provide convenient access to the military, and help 
overcome problems associated with a lack of familiarity with the military structure. In the context of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, communication between US-led coalition forces and humanitarian 
agencies was mediated through the establishment of a number of Coalitional Humanitarian Liaison 
Cells (CHLCs – pronounced “chicklets”). After the liberation of Kabul in early December 2001, the 
CJCMOTF was established for strategic command of CA assets.  At the tactical level, following the 
deployment of Special Forces operational detachment’s in key areas, the Coalition deployed CHLCs 
in several urban areas around Afghanistan.  The CHLCs in many ways functioned as CMOCs but did 
not  open  “store  front”  offices  as  was  common  practice  in  the  Balkans  and  other  post-conflict 
situations. This departure from the traditional use of CMOCs by the military has been criticized as an 
impediment to effective communication, information sharing and a source of considerable confusion 
for humanitarian agencies (James, 2003).  
In terms of the humanitarian community’s efforts to establish communication and coordination links 
with the military, there are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing 
humanitarian  personnel  on  civil-military  issues  and  practical  liaison  arrangements  in  complex 
emergencies. This includes the UNCMCoord (United Nations Civil-Military Coordination) induction 
courses, organised by OCHA’s Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU). In addition to UNCMCoord 
Officers deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) to focus on 
specific  sectorial  and  operational  civil  military  issues  and  DPKO  (Department  of  Peace  Keeping 
Operations)  may  deploy  Civil-Military  Liaison  Officers  (CMLOs).  Where  established,  the  United 
Nations  Joint  Logistics  Centre  (UNJLC),  an  inter-agency  facility,  also  provides  a  civil-military 
coordination function on an operational logistics level. 
In an emergency situation, the UN Secretary General may appoint a Special Representative (SRSG) to 
be  the  overall  coordinator  for  a  United  Nations  operation.  A  Special  Representative's  role  is  to 
provide leadership and coordination of policy and operational objectives for the mission. The Special 
Representative will generally provide guidance in an effort to harmonise the operational objectives 
of the political, military and humanitarian components of the mission.  In some cases the special UNCLASSIFIED 
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representative may take the form of a lead agency (e.g. UNHCR)
46 or HC. The decision about who to 
appoint as HC is made by the  ERC, in consultation with the  IASC. When an HC or Lead Agency has 
been designated, he or she is responsible for initiating requests for UN  MCDA (Military and Civil 
Defence Assets) or approving the use of other military and civil defence resources.  The ERC, in 
consultation with the IASC, provides the overall guidance for a particular complex emergency 
including parameters for the use of UN MCDA and other military and civil defence r esources to 
support UN humanitarian activities. The HC will then initiate the request for the use of military and 
civil defence resources in the field, within the parameters specified by the ERC and IASC. 
In response to a request for military assistance t he supporting military or civil defence commander 
will determine whether he/she can complete the task within his/her means and capabilities given 
his/her primary mission requirements. Provided that the means indicated by the military or civil 
defence commander respects the principles of the IASC  guidelines, the HC will then authorise the 
tasks to be undertaken by the designated unit.   In general, requests for military assistance, in 
whatever form, are initiated by the HC and are communicated to the force comm ander for 
evaluation and review; in turn, military forces should aim to coordinate all activities that may affect 
humanitarian assistance operations  with the HC through the missions' civil -military coordination 
structure.  Timely  coordination  of  such  action s  will  avert  inappropriate  action,  allow,  where 
necessary, appropriate military-humanitarian delineation and promote an increased impact for the 
affected population. Typically, a HIC will be established to coordinate relief efforts within the 
humanitarian community in the case of a complex emergency, and it is recommended that such 
units should include a military link , such as CIMIC/CMOC or civil affairs representatives,  as part of 
civil-military coordination activities. 
5.3.6  Information Exchange 
Whatever  the formal arrangements between military and humanitarian agencies  regarding  civil-
military coordination, there will always be a requirement to share information. Critical areas for 
information exchange include security, logistics, medical aid, transportation, and communications.  
In these areas the steady flow of timely information is essential for the success of humanitarian 
missions. Considerable quantities of humanitarian information can be gleaned by military forces 
going about their military business (e.g. state of the affected population, availability of key services 
and critical infrastructure). Conversely, humanitarian agencies can provide information regarding 
their activities in order that any military operations can be reconciled with those of humanitarian 
actors. Such information exchange is important if inadvertent damage, disruption and destruction of 
relief assets and unnecessary risks to humanitarian personnel and the civilian population are to be 
avoided. 
The  IASC  (Civil-Military  Relationship  in  Complex  Emergencies:  An  IASC  Reference  Paper,  2004) 
identifies a number of types of information that may be shared between military and humanitarian 
agencies, including: 
  Security Information: information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security 
situation in the area of operations. 
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  Humanitarian  Locations:  the  coordinates  of  humanitarian  staff  and  facilities  inside  the 
military theatre of operations. 
  Humanitarian Activities: the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing 
of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid 
accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities. 
  Mine Action Activities: information relevant to mine action activities. 
  Population Movements: information on the major movements of civilians. 
  Military Relief Activities: information on the relief effort undertaken by the military. 
  Post-Strike  Information:  information  on  strike  locations  and  explosive  munitions  used 
during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and 
mine action/UXO activities. 
  Transport Infrastructure Information: the integrity of roads and bridges and other transport 
routes. 
  Communication Infrastructure: e.g. the best location for radio repeaters. 
Unfortunately,  there  are  a  number  of  problems  confronting  the  free  exchange  of  information 
between military and humanitarian agencies. The military, for example, cannot disclose classified 
information; whereas humanitarian relief organizations are reluctant to share information that may 
look like ‘intelligence’ about the conflict and thus threaten the security of their staff and operations 
in the field (Good Practices: Information Sharing in Complex Emergencies, 2002). 
While  the  efforts  of  civil  affairs  personnel  can  help  to  filter  classified  from  unclassified  and 
‘intelligence’ from logistical information and deliver appropriately useful information to field-based 
relief organizations, a number of key issues remain for any emergency situation occurring against a 
backdrop of military intervention: 
  What information should/could be shared, with whom and when? 
  How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated 
from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive? 
  How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are 
strictly  humanitarian?  For  example,  how  do  we  ensure  that  information  on  population 
movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes? 
  Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military 
and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another 
while being mindful of the sensitivities involved in information exchange? 
  When and how should information provided by the military be independently verified? 
5.3.7  Conclusion 
Any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While 
military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the 
overall authority and control of the responsible HC. Military and civil defence assets that have been 
placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for 
humanitarian purposes must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from 
military assets being used for military purposes. UNCLASSIFIED 
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5.4  Knowledge Management 
Humanitarian organizations have a number of knowledge management requirements with respect 
to  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  relief.  They  need  to  be  able  to  identify  what  information  they 
require, where to find it, and how best to share, present and disseminate this information. Many of 
these challenges can be addressed by knowledge-based systems approaches (King, 2005; Smart et 
al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2002). Knowledge system solutions can assist humanitarian organizations with 
respect to information search and retrieval, knowledge distillation and decision making, all of which 
serve to improve situation awareness and enhance operational effectiveness in the delivery of aid 
solutions. Many aid organizations are recognizing the potential value of such initiatives in leveraging 
their latent knowledge to propitiate more effective response outcomes with respect to relief efforts. 
Oxfam,  for  example,  has  adopted  a  long  term  knowledge  management  strategy  as  part  of  its 
Strategic Plan (Powell, 2003; Stephen, 2001). 
Typically, different types of information at varying levels of resolution are required by individuals 
involved in relief efforts: 
“Certain background and situational information is needed by all humanitarian 
organizations:  NGOs,  UN  agencies,  governments  and  donors.  Other  types  of 
information are more specifically needed by different personnel within these aid 
organizations. For example, humanitarian organization policy makers want ‘big 
picture snapshot’ analysis in order to understand the issues, to make decisions on 
providing assistance, and to be alerted to problems and obstacles. Field personnel 
and  project  desk  officers  in  aid  organizations,  on  the  other  hand,  need  more 
detailed  operational  and  programmatic  information  in  order  to  plan  and 
implement  humanitarian  assistance  and  reconstruction  programs.”(King,  2005; 
pg. 1) 
Potential uses of knowledge systems include (Zhang et al., 2002): 
  the prediction of the general nature or trend of a disaster; 
  the evaluation of disaster severity so that planning, training, and stockpiling can be done 
quickly for medical supply, engineering, security, communications and other functions; 
  the generation of timely, specific warnings to local authorities in the disaster region, thereby 
reducing the effects on resources and the population; 
  disaster mitigation; 
  the real-time distributed collaborative planning and coordination of relief actions. 
King (2005) proposes some general guidelines in terms of best practice for knowledge management 
initiatives related to humanitarian relief. These include: 
  Conduct an assessment of information needs and existing knowledge resources in advance, 
and identify the gaps in data, information and knowledge; 
  Provide  standardized  meta-data  (source,  date,  geo-reference,  definitions)  along  with  all 
collected and shared information, so that it can be pooled, compared, verified, mapped, and 
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  Establish  and  use  collaboration  networks  to  create  communities  of  interest  among 
individuals in multiple organizations as a means to capture and share tacit knowledge and 
dismantle organizational stovepipes47; 
  Employ  visualization  to  represent  complex  data  and  information,  display  patterns  and 
relationships, and depict a  geo-spatial common operating picture; 
  Demonstrate the practical applications of new information tools and technologies and use 
collected data and information to answer questions and respond to identified information 
needs; 
  Recognize  the  value  of  tacit  knowledge  gained  from  field  experience,  collaboration  and 
learned expertise; 
  Promote the use of new tools and technologies, such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), 
Global  Positioning  Systems  (GPS),  Geographic  Information  Systems  (GIS),  and  virtual 
collaboration networks and provide advance training in order to ensure that personnel use 
them effectively and routinely in their work. 
As yet, few examples of comprehensive knowledge system solutions in the domain humanitarian 
relief can be provided. One description of such a system is provided by Zhang et al (2002) who 
propose a framework composed of a disaster case base, a catalogue of relief organizations and a 
knowledge store aimed at: 
  providing recommendations of courses of action for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
decision-makers; 
  maintaining both historical and newly updated information for pre-disaster prediction or 
systematic disaster analysis; 
  enabling information and knowledge sharing; 
  functioning as a federated resource for creating new knowledge. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear from Zhang et al’s (2002) paper whether the description they provide is a 
description of an extant knowledge system or merely a proposal for a potential knowledge system 
solution. 
5.5  Humanitarian Information Centres 
The scenario described in this document features the deployment of a HIC in Kabul, which serves as 
the focus for information dissemination, coordination and inter-agent communication. When an 
emergency occurs OCHA, acting on behalf of the UN and at the request of the HC, will typically 
establish a HIC in cooperation with other agencies and NGOs. The HIC is a semi-permanent facility 
that aims to provide information and professional services to humanitarian organizations as they 
implement relief and rehabilitation projects. Typically, the HIC establishes a physical space where 
those involved in relief efforts can meet and coordinate their activities
48. In this sense the HIC serves 
                                                            
47 Zhang et al (2002) also advocate the use of collaborative technologies, such as Web-based groupware and 
on-line bulletin boards because decision making in humanitarian contexts typically requires the collaboration 
of multiple relief agencies or organizations. 
48 It may also provide a virtual space in the form of a website, which serves to disseminate information via the 
internet. In the case of Afghanistan, the  AIMS (Afghanistan Information Management Service) organization 
exists as an HIC, providing informat ion about ongoing relief efforts in the country as well as access to 
geographical and population datasets (http://www.aims.org.af/). UNCLASSIFIED 
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as hub for inter-agency coordination and information exchange. The main purposes of the HIC are to 
support: 
“the  coordination  of  humanitarian  assistance  through  the  provision  of 
information  products  and  services;  and  the  decision  making  process  at  the 
headquarters  and  field  level  by  contributing  to  the  creation  of  a  common 
framework for information management within the humanitarian community.” 
(An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers, 2004) 
In their evaluation of HICs, USAID (US Agency for International Development) note that humanitarian 
organizations typically find certain forms of information particularly useful in the early stages of an 
emergency (An Evaluation of Humanitarian Information Centers, 2004). These include basic maps 
showing the geography of the country, the location of, for example, settlements, roads, IDP camps, 
and offices. Maps showing security-related information, such as incidents of civil disturbance or 
military conflict, the location of UXO and IDP/refugee movements were also deemed to be of great 
value. Another popular information product is a WDWW analysis, i.e. an analysis of the agencies 
already operating in the region, their location and sectorial focus and aid activities. This information 
is  arguably  important  in  terms  of  improved  situation  awareness,  and  better  coordination  and 
communication  between  relief  agencies,  especially  in  regard  to  the  planning  of  relief  efforts.  A 
number of NGOs also commented on the value of contact lists for enabling communication in the 
context of the USAID report. 
5.6  Early Warning Systems & Disaster Notification 
Early warning and disaster notification systems are an essential element of effective humanitarian 
assistance.  For  many  types  of  natural  disasters  -  flash  floods,  storms,  forest  fires,  volcanoes, 
tsunamis - forecasting and early warning information and communication systems need to be in 
place.  These  systems  collect  and  disseminate  information  on  the  potential  development  of  the 
disaster, and determine the extent of its humanitarian impact. In the first few hours of a disaster, 
decisive  action  is  necessary.  In  sudden  onset  disasters,  local officials  should  issue  a  preliminary 
“disaster early notification” as soon as possible after the disaster occurs - preferably within the first 
10 hours after a disaster. This early notification alerts headquarters that a disaster has occurred and 
approximates the magnitude and location of the disaster and immediate priorities, such as search 
and rescue, and on-site first aid. 
A number of information sources provide early warning and disaster notification capabilities. These 
include: 
  Reuters AlertNet
49: a humanitarian news network based around a popular website. It aims to 
keep relief professionals and the wider public up-to-date on humanitarian crises around the 
globe. 
   GDACS
50: provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around the world 
  ReliefWeb
51: a World Wide Web site for humanitarian emergencies. This is a project of UN 
OCHA that was initiated in 1996. It serves as an electronic central repository to meet the 
                                                            
49 http://www.alertnet.org/ 
50 http://www.gdacs.org/ 
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information needs of the humanitarian relief community. ReliefWeb enables users to access 
the information via the Internet at any time, any place. It contains daily-updated disaster 
information in a variety of forms, including situation reports, maps, press releases, appeals, 
and so on. Information is organized into multiple categories and indexes are established. 
This enables users to slice and dice information. 
  Virtual OSOCC
52 (Virtual Operations On Site Coordination Center): this site provides a portal 
for information sharing between the humanitarian community and government agencies. Its 
purpose is not strictly to provide a disaster notification capability so much as to enabl e the 
exchange of information between participants in a relief effort. 
  HEWS
53  (Humanitarian Early Warning Service): HEWS is the humanitarian early warning 
system provided by the IASC. It aims to provide a common platform for humanitarian early 
warnings and forecasts for natural hazards and worldwide socio-political developments. 
  EMM (Europe Media Monitor) news Brief
54: The EMM News Brief is a summary of news 
stories from around the world. The EMM alert system detects and classifies articles as they 
appear in the media. Each alert definition consists of keywords, which are matched to media 
reports. When matched, a reference to the article is placed in the appropriate alert category. 
A large number of specific early warning systems also exist in addition to thes e more generic 
services, e.g. FEWS
55 (Famine Early Warning System), USGS
56 (US Geological Survey), TSR
57 (Tropical 
Storm Risk), PTWC
58 (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center), etc. Of the aforementioned systems, GDACS 
provides a particularly interesting exemplar in the case in of the AKTiveSA project. GDACS relies on a 
knowledge system and modelling system to infer information about the likely humanitarian impact 
of a hazardous phenomenon. Each phenomenon is characterised in terms of its essential features, 
the likely impact of the phenomenon (e.g. the number of people affected), the coping capacity and 
vulnerability of the affected region and any secondary affects that may occur as a result of the 
phenomenon. This information is used to generate a natural language tex tual summary of the 
phenomenon vis-à-vis its likely humanitarian impact, e.g.  
“On 2005-09-26 01:55:19 +0000 UTC+2 an earthquake of magnitude 7.15 has 
struck the moderately populated region of Loreto, Peru. Whether international 
humanitarian aid is needed must be decided by an expert. However, the following 
automatically calculated elements can help. This earthquake has potentially a low 
humanitarian impact. The affected region has a medium vulnerability to natural 
disasters and the population has a high coping capacity.”
59 
5.7  Information Requirements 
If officials responsible for organizing post-disaster relief operations are to make effective decisions 
about the deployment of resources it is essential that they be properly informed. Humanitarian 
actors require appropriate and timely information about what has happened, what needs to be 
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done, and what resources are available. King (2005) argues that humanitarian organizations typically 
require four types of information, viz.: 
  Information relevant to situation awareness: Aid organizations need to know the latest 
about  the  situation  on  the  ground  and  information  about  the  conditions,  needs,  and 
locations of affected populations. For example: 
o  What is the latest/current humanitarian situation in the country? 
o  What  are  the  most  recent  severity  indicators?  (death  tolls,  mortality  rates, 
malnutrition rates, economic impact, infrastructure damage, etc.) 
o  Who are the affected populations (refugees, IDPs, children and other vulnerable 
groups,  resident  populations,  etc),  how  many  are  there,  and  where  are  they 
located? 
o  What are the conditions and humanitarian needs of the affected populations? 
o  What is the assessment of damage to infrastructure? (transport, buildings, housing, 
communications, etc) 
o  What is the latest/current security situation in the affected areas of the country? 
  Operational/Programmatic  Information:  information  necessary  to  plan  and  implement 
humanitarian assistance programs. Information relevant to this category includes: 
o  Where are and what are the conditions of the logistical access routes for delivering 
humanitarian assistance? 
o  Who’s Doing What Where? What humanitarian organizations are working in the 
country, what are their programs, what are their capacities and where are they 
working? 
o  How is the host country/government responding and can it provide more? 
o  What are the programmatic/financial needs of the humanitarian organizations? 
o  What and how much is being provided to the humanitarian response organizations 
and who are the donors? 
  Background  Information:  information  that  is  needed  to  provide  knowledge  about  the 
unique history, geography, population, political and economic structure, infrastructure and 
culture of the country. Baseline data are also necessary for aid organizations in order to be 
able to compare the emergency situation and conditions to previous normal conditions. 
Information relevant to this category includes: 
o  What  is  the  country’s  population  (national,  province/state,  city/town)  and  its 
composition (ethnicity, religion, age cohorts, urban/rural, political, etc)? 
o  What is the geography of the country? 
o  What are the country’s past disasters and natural hazards? 
o  What  are  the  most  recent  annual  baseline  health  indicators  for  the  population? 
(Crude  Mortality  Rate,  Infant/Child  Mortality  Rates,  HIV  adult  prevalence, 
malnutrition, etc) 
o  What are the annual economic indicators? (GDP, GNP, agricultural/food production, 
staple food prices, etc) 
  Analysis-Related  Information:  information  that  needs  to  be  interpreted  in  context  and 
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Knowledge-Intensive Fusion for Situational Awareness  52 
 
o  What are the causes and contributing factors of the emergency? 
o  What  are  the  constraints  to  providing  humanitarian  assistance?  (insecurity, 
inaccessibility, government interference, etc) 
o  How effective are humanitarian assistance programs and responses? 
o  What are the future impacts of the emergency? 
o  What are the options and recommendations for action? 
There are multiple sources of information that need to be integrated in the context of humanitarian 
activities. Situational information is reported in the news, but more directly in the situation reports 
and  field  assessments  from  the  humanitarian  response  organizations  working  in  the  affected 
countries. These humanitarian organizations also produce and issue appeals, proposals, and project 
monitoring  documents  that  provide  operational  and  programmatic  information.  Useful 
background/baseline  information  can  be  found  in  country  profiles,  maps,  databases,  and 
chronologies. Analysis is also derived from evaluations, lessons learned, research studies and policy 
recommendations.  
Information  is  typically  available  in  a  number  of  formats  including  plain  text,  photos,  satellite 
imagery, video footage, hand sketches and maps. Of course not everything that aid organizations 
need  to  know  can  be  found  in  databases,  documents  and  visual  products.  There  is  also  tacit 
knowledge  that  is  usually  not  documented,  but  derived  from  expertise,  collaboration  and  field 
experience (King, 2005). 
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Appendix A Acronyms & Abbreviations 
ACTED      Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 
AEW      Airborne Early Warning 
APC      Armoured Personnel Carrier 
AWACS      Airborne Warning And Control System 
       
C4I      Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence 
CA      Civil Affairs 
CAO      Civil Affairs Operations 
CAS      Close Air Support 
CHLC      Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center 
CIMIC      Civil Military Coordination 
CJCMOTF    Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force 
CMLO      Civil-Military Liaison Officers 
CMOC      Civil-Military Operations Center 
COA      Courses of Action 
CoSAR-TS    Coalition Search and Rescue - Task Support 
       
DACAAR      Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees 
DPKO      Department of Peace Keeping Operations 
DTC      Defence Technology Centre 
       
EMM      Europe Media Monitor 
EO      Earth Observation 
ERC      Emergency Relief Coordinator 
       
FAO      Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FEWS      Famine Early Warning System 
FOB      Forward Operating Base UNCLASSIFIED 
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FOO      Forward Observer Officer 
       
GDACS      Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System 
GDP      Gross Domestic Product 
GIS      Geographic Information System 
GIST      Geographic Information Support Team 
GNP      Gross National Product 
GPS      Global Positioning System 
       
HC      Humanitarian Coordinator 
HEWS      Humanitarian Early Warning Service 
HIC      Humanitarian Information Center 
HIV      Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HQ      Headquarters 
       
IASC      Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
ICRC      International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDP      Internally Displaced Person 
IFV      Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
ISAF      International Security Assistance Force 
ITOS      Information Technology Outreach Service 
       
MCDA      Military and Civil Defence Assets 
MCDU      Military and Civil Defence Unit 
MLO      Military Liaison Officer 
MoD      Ministry of Defence 
MSF      Médecin Sans Frontières 
       
NATO      North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NEIC      National Earthquake Information Center UNCLASSIFIED 
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NGO      Non-Governmental Organization 
       
OCHA      UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OWL      Web Ontology Language (W3C) 
       
PDA      Personal Digital Assistant 
PTWC      Pacific Tsunami Warning Center 
       
RECCE      Reconnaissance 
       
SAR      Search And Rescue 
SHARE      Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting Exchange 
SITREP      Situation Report 
SOP      Standard Operating Procedure 
SRSG      Special Representative to the Secretary General 
       
TDS      Technical Demonstrator System 
TSR      Tropical Storm Risk 
       
UK      United Kingdom 
UN      United Nations 
UNAMA      United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan 
UNCMCoord    United Nations Civil-Military Coordination 
UNHCR      United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNITAR      UN Institute for Training and Research 
UNJLC      United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 
UNOPS      United Nations Office for Project Services 
US      United States 
USAID      United States Agency for International Development 
USGS      United States Geological Survey UNCLASSIFIED 
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UXO      Unexploded Ordnance 
       
Virtual OSOCC    Virtual Operations On Site Coordination Center 
       
WFP      World Food Programme 
WHO      World Health Organization 
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Appendix B Needs Assessment Checklist 
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Appendix C Needs Assessment Report Form 
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